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Free Trade Agreements and Purchasing Power Parity: Evidence from South 
Korea 
We explore whether a decline in tariffs after the passage of South Korea’s free trade 
agreements yields evidence more favorable to purchasing power parity between South 
Korea and its free trade partners. Our data include two aggregated measures of prices – the 
CPI and the PPI – as well as disaggregated CPI data for six selected, highly tradable items: 
food, alcoholic beverages, non-alcoholic beverages, clothing, footwear and tobacco 
products. We study nine free trade partners using data for the sample period January 1998-
November 2017. Utilizing a battery of conventional linear unit root tests, we find limited 
support for PPP between South Korea and its FTA partners after the free trade agreement.  
Our results suggest that, even after the removal of tariffs, other barriers to trade may exist 
that impede the free flow of goods and the attainment of purchasing power parity.  It is also 
possible that alternative tests that incorporate non-linearities may explain our results.   
Free Trade Agreements and Market Integration: Evidence from South Korea 
We consider the effects of free trade agreements on market integration between 
South Korea and its FTA partners. Free trade agreements should reduce tariffs and trade 




a non-linear self-exciting threshold autoregressive (TAR) model, by introducing a 
threshold break at the effective FTA date. This strategy allows us to consider: (1) whether 
trade costs have declined after the free trade agreement; and (2) whether the speed of 
adjustment in the home-foreign price differential is faster after the FTA. Our study covers 
nine of fifteen South Korea's free trade agreements. We find evidence that after free trade 
agreements, trade costs have been reduced for several countries, providing evidence that 
greater market integration has been achieved on this score. However, evidence on whether 
the speed of home-to-foreign price convergence increases after free trade agreements is 
limited.  
Does Inflation Targeting matter for Inflation Persistence? 
Inflation targeting is a practice that central banks around the world began to adopt 
as early as 1990. Inflation targeting policy was expected to lead to success on three counts: 
(1) a decline in the level of inflation, (2) a reduction in the volatility of inflation, and (3) a 
decline in inflation persistence, as a central bank publicly announced its commitment to a 
target range for inflation. However, studies are divided over whether the three outcomes 
have been realized.  Studies of inflation targeting to date have generally relied on variations 
of linear, autoregressive models.  However, there are no studies of inflation targeting to 
our knowledge that examine inflation persistence by using a model that allows for threshold 
non-linearity at the targeted inflation range. In this paper, we adapt a threshold 
autoregressive (TAR) model to study inflation persistence using a select sample of inflation 
targeters. We compare estimates of inflation persistence from a TAR model over the 
inflation targeting sample to estimates of persistence from a linear autoregressive model 




in inflation persistence across level of development and for countries that have ever 
experienced hyperinflation. To address issues raised that events unrelated to inflation 
targeting policy could explain our findings, we include a select set of eight non-IT targeters 
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CHAPTER 1  FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND PURCHASING POWER     
PARITY: EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH KOREA 
 
1.1  Introduction 
The Law of One Price (LOP) states the price of an identical good between two 
countries should be equalized, once the prices are converted into the same currency. If we 
expand this to the basket of goods and services, it would be Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). 
Even though LOP or PPP are building blocks of international economics and finance, there 
is limited supportive evidence for LOP or PPP in the real world. For example, the price of 
iPad air (16 GB, Wi-Fi ) varies across countries; the price of iPad air (16GB, Wi-Fi) in 
Argentina in 2013 is US $1,094, but its price in Malaysia in 2013 is US $473 1 . According 
to “Buy Low and Sell High”, the price of a good should be equalized across countries; 
however, there is limited supportive evidence of LOP or PPP in the real world; i.e., the 
question remains, how could an identical good have different prices across countries?  
Many studies have centered research on the question: why LOP or PPP does not 
hold in the real world? There are several factors which may influence LOP or PPP; 
however, Sarno and Taylor (2002) with other studies (e.g., Rogoff, 1996; Taylor and 
Taylor, 2004) argue trade barriers, such as tariffs and non-tariffs, and trade costs play a 
dominant role affecting price differentials of identical goods across countries. That is, trade 
                                                 





barriers and trade costs create a wedge between the price of an identical good across 
countries.  
Since the 1900’s, many countries in the world have endeavored to decline or 
eliminate trade barriers among nearby countries by using Free Trade Agreements (FTA). 
FTA is one of the trade policies that may eliminate or decrease trade barriers, particularly 
tariffs. The fact that trade barriers across countries are declining means the markets are 
integrated. By promoting FTA among neighboring countries, many countries in the world 
are trying to achieve market integration among member countries. South Korea is not an 
exception in this endeavor.  
As of January 2018, South Korea has fifteen effective FTAs with fifty-two 
countries. FTA between South Korea and its FTA partners would decrease trade barriers 
between them by eliminating or decreasing tariffs, and a decline in trade barriers may 
increase trade volumes between South Korea and its FTA partners. Because of economies 
of scope and scale due to increase in trade volumes after FTA, all trade costs such as 
transportation costs or distribution costs would decline (Hummels and Skiba, 2002; 2009). 
This may suggest FTA has a positive effect on PPP between South Korea and its FTA 
partners. In this study, we explore whether FTA matters for PPP between South Korea and 
its FTA partners.  
There are some studies on the effects of FTA on PPP; Blavy et al. (2009) and Dutt 
et al. (2014) focus on the effects of NAFTA on PPP, and Engel et al. (1996) and Moodley 
et al. (2000) focus on whether CUSTA would help PPP hold between Canada and the U.S. 





Dutt et al. (2014), Engel et al. (1996) and Moodley et al. (2000) do not find supportive 
evidence of PPP among Canada, the U.S. and Mexico after FTA may be because relative 
to other countries, these countries already had lower trade barriers, and also they were 
major trade partners with each other before CUSTA or NAFTA. Possibly, Canada, the U.S. 
and Mexico may not be good examples to explore the positive effects of FTA on PPP.  
Our study is distinctive in three ways. One distinction concerns the sample 
countries that had relatively high trade barriers and were not major trade partners for pre-
FTA unlike the sample countries investigated in previous studies (e.g., Blavy et al., 2009; 
Dutt et al., 2014; Engel et al., 1996; Moodley et al., 2000). In other words, South Korea 
and its FTA partners had relatively high trade barriers for pre-FTA, and most were not 
South Korea’s major trade partners. If FTA matters for PPP, the countries in our sample 
may help to identify stronger supportive evidence of PPP for post-FTA. The second 
distinction is that this study would be possibly the first Korean study to the best of our 
knowledge to assess the effects of FTA from the perspective of market integration. 
Although market integration among member countries is the objective of FTA, there are 
few South Korean studies on the effects of FTA on market integration2 . Many studies test 
whether LOP or PPP holds to find the evidence of market integration among countries3. 
Our study may answer whether market integration has been achieved between South Korea 
and its FTA partners. Finally, we investigate whether there is supportive evidence of PPP 
after FTA with various types of unit root tests as well as both aggregate price indices (i.e., 
                                                 
2 There is literature available on South Korea’s FTA where the focus is on the negative 
effects of FTA on South Korea’s economy, e.g., the negative effects of FTA on agricultural 
industries, and how to resolve these issues. 





CPI and PPI) and disaggregate price indices. It may give a more robust explanation on the 
effects of FTA on PPP for overall economy and the selected individual goods markets.  
Our findings show limited supportive evidence for the positive FTA impact on PPP 
between South Korea and its FTA partners, and the results are heterogeneous across unit 
root tests and price indices: Both aggregate CPI and PPI support the positive impacts of 
FTA on PPP only for Peru, but not for other countries. For disaggregate level of CPI, we 
find positive effects of FTA on PPP only for the U.S.; however, the results are different by 
goods and unit root tests. ADF unit root test with the null of non-stationarity support the 
positive effects of FTA on PPP only for footwear while KPSS unit root test with the null 
of stationarity supports the positive impacts of FTA on PPP for food, non-alcoholic 
beverage, alcoholic beverage and footwear. Our findings may suggest that the objective of 
FTA, market integration, is not achieved between South Korea and its FTA partners.  
Although after FTA, tariffs on around seventy percentage of imports between South 
Korea and its FTA partners were eliminated or reduced, and also trade volumes increased, 
there is limited supportive evidence of PPP between South Korea and its FTA partners. 
This suggests that a decline in tariffs may not matter for PPP, and factors other than a 
decline in tariffs4 exert a stronger influence on PPP; e.g., a decrease in volatility of nominal 
exchange rates may have a more significant impact on PPP 5  .  
                                                 
4 The other examples for the alternative explanations could be heterogeneous qualities of 
goods across countries, different export demand elasticity by country and local currency 
pricing, etc. 
5 Engel et al. (2001)'s finding may support this as Engel et al. (2001) discover a decline in 





This study is organized as follows: the effects of FTA on Korean economy are 
shown in section 1.2, and we introduce purchasing power parity and previous studies on 
the effects of FTA on PPP in section 1.3. We describe data and empirical models in section 
1.4. Also, we present the empirical results in section 1.5 and then we explore factors that 
may affect LOP or PPP in section 1.6. Finally, we conclude this study in section 1.7.  
1.2  South Korea’s FTAs and Its Effects 
As of January, in 2018, South Korea has signed fifteen Free Trade Agreements 
including the latest Columbia FTA (July 2016) with fifty-two countries (Table 1.1) after 
FTA between South Korea and Chile was in effect in 2004.  The objective of FTA is market 
integration among member countries, eliminating trade barriers among them.  
For free trade agreements with trade blocs-EFTA, ASEAN and EU-, there are at 
least four countries involved. We select one country having the highest trade volume with 
South Korea: Norway from KOR-EFTA FTA, Indonesia from KOR-ASEAN FTA and 
Germany from KOR-EU FTA. With effective fifteen FTAs, South Korea has been 
negotiating FTAs with other countries such as Korea-China-Japan FTA and South Korea - 
Israel FTA. 
Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 display tariffs for about seventy percent of the imports 
eliminated during the first year of FTA. The decrease and elimination of tariffs may 
increase trade openness. Table 1.4 displays trade openness increasing since FTA for most 
FTA partners. Alba et al. (2007) and Wu et al. (2011) find that trade openness has positive 





would be decreased as an increase in trade volume may cause economies of scope and 
scales (see Hummel and Skiba, 2002; 2009).  
Some studies (e.g. Alba et al., 2005; Cho et al., 2014; Lothian et al., 2002) find that 
PPP would be more likely to hold when real exchange rate is less volatile between two 
countries6. Accordingly, we investigate whether real exchange rate volatility is less volatile 
after FTA. Table 1.5 displays other countries than Norway show the real exchange rate 
volatility has decreased after FTA. This may suggest PPP between South Korea and other 
FTA partners than Norway might be more likely to hold after FTA. 
1.3  Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and Previous Studies 
1.3.1  Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
PPP dictates the nominal exchange rate between two countries, domestic country 
and foreign country, should be equal to the ratio of price levels between the two countries, 








where, 𝑆𝑡: nominal exchange rate, 𝑃𝑡: domestic price level,  𝑃𝑡
∗: foreign price level  
                                                 
6 Since Mussa (1986) argues that the volatility of real exchange rate is lower under fixed 
exchange rate regimes than under floating exchange rate regimes, many studies look at 
how the volatility of real exchange rates influence PPP and find there is more supportive 
evidence of PPP under a fixed exchange rate regime. Previous studies, thus, suggest that 






Since aggregate price indices such as CPI or PPI are used as price levels when 
testing whether PPP holds, if price indices of two countries have different composition of 
goods and services of basket, equation (1.1) might not hold. To allow for different baskets 
of price indices between two countries, Cassel (1918) argues PPP presents the percentage 
change in exchange rate between two countries is the same as the difference of the 
percentage change in two countries’ price level (inflation rate), known as relative PPP. We 
can represent this, taking natural logarithm of each side of equation (1.1), as follows: 
 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡
∗ (1.2) 
where, 𝑠𝑡 : the natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate, 𝑝𝑡 : the natural 
logarithm of domestic price level,  𝑝𝑡
∗: the natural logarithm of foreign price level 
Some previous studies (e.g. Frenkel, 1976) test relative PPP, utilizing the following 
equation (1.3): 
 𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑡
∗ + 𝜖𝑡 (1.3) 
where, 𝑠𝑡 : the natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate, 𝑝𝑡 : the natural 
logarithm of domestic price level,  𝑝𝑡
∗: the natural logarithm of foreign price level, 𝜖𝑡: white 
noise 
They test whether the coefficients of the equation (1.3) are satisfied with both 
symmetry (𝛽1 = −𝛽2) and proportionality (𝛽1 = −𝛽2 = 1) to see whether PPP holds. They 
do not, however, consider whether all three variables are stationary before carrying out 





During the 1980s, other researchers (e.g. Adler et al., 1983; Darby, 1983; Edison, 1987; 
Meese et al., 1988) derived real exchange rate from equation (1.2) as follows: 
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗ + 𝜖𝑡 
 
(1.4) 
where, 𝑟𝑡: the natural logarithm of the real exchange rate, 𝑝𝑡: the natural logarithm 
of domestic price level,  𝑝𝑡
∗: the natural logarithm of foreign price level 
They test for evidence of PPP through an examination of the time-series properties 
of real exchange rate as follows: 
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 (1.5) 
where, 𝑟𝑡: the natural logarithm of the real exchange rate, 𝜖𝑡: white noise 
According to the LOP or PPP theory, if PPP holds, the real exchange rate should 
settle down at zero over time; meaning, the price differential of identical goods would be 
zero over time. In other words, the real exchange rate would be mean-reverting toward zero 
as shown in Figure 1.1.  
However, empirically, aggregate price indices are used to test for PPP, and thus real 
exchange rate would settle down at any constant level. In order that PPP holds, mean-
reversion is a necessary condition. Many researchers examine whether a real exchange rate 
contains a unit root (𝜌 =1) to see whether PPP is supportive. If |𝜌| = 17, Real exchange rate 
follows random walk., the real exchange rate contains a unit root, which means that the 
                                                 





real exchange rate does not revert toward its mean, so PPP is not supportive. If | 𝜌 | <1, it 
means the real exchange rate reverts towards its mean, which means PPP is supportive. 
If FTA helps PPP hold, real exchange rate between South Korea and its FTA 
partners would be less persistent and mean-revert toward its mean quickly after FTA as 
shown in Figure 1.2.  
1.3.2  Previous studies on the Effects of FTA on PPP 
There are many factors affecting PPP8. However, Sarno et al. (2004) argue trade 
barriers and trade costs may play a dominant role on PPP holds. Some studies (e.g. Dumas, 
1992; Sercu et al., 1995; Taylor et al., 2004; Zussman, 2002) find that trade barriers such 
as tariffs and non-tariffs affect price differentials among countries; i.e., when trade barriers 
among countries decline, there may be more supportive evidence of PPP. Obstfeld et al. 
(1997) and Zussman (2002) find a positive relationship between price differentials and 
trade barriers among 32 countries, and 101 countries, respectively. Therefore, we may 
expect more supportive evidence of PPP among member countries when Free Trade 
Agreements are in effect. However, most empirical studies find limited evidence for the 
positive impacts of FTA on PPP.  
Engel et al. (1996) and Moodley et al. (2000) investigate whether PPP holds 
between Canada and the U.S. after CUSTA. Engel et al. (1996) do not find positive effects 
of FTA on a decline in price differential between the U.S. and Canada after CUSTA, 
instead they discover larger price differentials between them. However, Moodley et al. 
                                                 
8 trade openness, growth rate, inflation and distance, different productivity levels, language 





(2000) find supportive evidence of PPP both pre- and post- CUSTA. Since it is not clear 
whether the supportive evidence of PPP for post-CUSTA results from CUSTA or not, they 
cannot argue the positive effects of CUSTA on PPP between the U.S. and Canada.  
Blavy et al. (2009) and Dutt et al. (2014) explore whether NAFTA has positive 
influences on PPP among Canada, Mexico and the U.S. Blavy et al. (2009) utilize 
Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) Model with both aggregate CPI and disaggregate CPIs. 
They find the speed of mean-reversion of real exchange rate is faster for post-NAFTA for 
all three countries. However, the speed of mean-reversion of real exchange rate between 
the U.S. and Canada is relatively faster than the speed of mean-reversion of real exchange 
rate between the U.S. and Mexico, and between Canada and Mexico. Also, they discover 
the speeds of mean-reversion of real exchange rate are different across commodities and 
countries. Dutt et al. (2014) use Pedroni Panel Cointegration test with CPI; however, they 
do not find supportive evidence of PPP after NAFTA among Canada, Mexico and the U.S.  
Lee (2010) finds supportive evidence of PPP among seven Multilateral Free Trade 
Agreements (e.g., ASEANFTA, CISFTA, EEA etc.) using Pedroni Panel Unit root test. 
However, she explores whether there is supportive evidence of PPP only for post-FTA. As 
Lee (2010) does not compare supportive evidence of PPP among the countries between 
pre-and post-FTA, her findings may not argue clearly whether supportive evidence of PPP 
is from FTA or something else. In addition, since she uses panel unit root test, she could 
not tell which two countries or how many countries among member countries hold PPP. 
Wei et al. (1995) investigate whether countries in two free trade areas - the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) hold PPP; 





1.4  Empirical Model and Data 
1.4.1  Empirical Model 
For PPP, a real exchange rate should be stationary. When this happens, the real 
exchange rate converges on a constant level, called mean - reverting. We explore whether 
a real exchange rate is mean - reverting, using a battery of unit root tests. There are various 
unit root test methodologies. In general, there are two types of unit root tests: singular unit 
root tests (e.g., Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS)) and panel unit root tests (e.g., Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC), Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS)).  
As one of singular unit root tests, ADF unit root test is specifically utilized to test 
PPP, and its null hypothesis is that a real exchange rate has a unit root. However, because 
of low test power of ADF unit root test, if there are not enough long-term period real 
exchange rate data, it cannot detect the stationarity of real exchange rate. Accordingly, 
many researchers (e.g., Abuaf et al. 1990; Flood et al. 1996; O'Connell 1998; Papell 1997) 
suggest panel unit root tests because they could raise the test power by increasing the 
information used in the test. Since Abuaf et al. (1990) showed panel unit root tests support 
PPP in the short run, many researchers (e.g., Flood et al. 1996; Frankel et al. 1996; 
O'Connell 1998; Papell 1997) have used a panel unit root test to increase the test power. 
There are several types of panel unit root tests; however, Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) panel unit 
root test and Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel unit root test are used most often to test PPP. 
LLC panel unit root test does not allow different 𝜌 across panels; however, IPS panel unit 
root test does, and thus we use IPS panel unit root test in this study. A concern with the IPS 
panel unit root test is that its null hypothesis is joint non-mean reversion of all real exchange 





of the real exchange rate data has mean-reversion; thus, basically cannot identify how many 
countries or which country’s real exchange rate has mean-reversion.  
Due to the limitation of conventional standard unit root tests (e.g., ADF unit root 
test), Elliot et al. (1996) propose a unit root test with generalized least square detrending 
of the data to improve test power. This is referred to as the Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least 
Squares (DF-GLS) unit root test. DF-GLS unit root test has higher test power than ADF 
unit root test. We can perform DF-GLS unit root test by an individual country; thus, 
resolving the uninformative issue with panel unit root test.  
There is another type of unit root test called Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) unit root test that Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) suggest. Unlike the null of ADF, DF-
GLS and IPS panel unit root test (𝐻0 = 𝐼(1)), the null of KPSS unit root test is a real 
exchange rate does not have unit root (𝐻0 = 𝐼(0)). Utilizing various unit root tests with 
two opposite null hypotheses, we may have more robust evidence regarding PPP holds 
after FTA9.  
1.4.1.1  Im-Pesaran-Shin Panel Unit Root Test 
 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel unit root test specification is represented by equation 
(1.6): 
 
𝛥𝑟𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1
∆𝑟𝑗,𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖𝑗,𝑡 
(1.6) 
                                                 
9 Henricsson et al. (1995) argue that we can see the stationarity of a time series data, 
strongly by comparing the results between ADF unit root test (I(1)) and KPSS unit root 
test (I(0)) with apposite null hypothesis, which is called “𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠”. Choi 





The subscript 𝑗 indexes South Korea's FTA partners, 𝜖𝑗,𝑡 is independently 
distributed normal for 𝑗  and 𝑡 , and 𝜖𝑗,𝑡  has heterogeneous variances across panels. 𝑝 
indicates lag, and we follow Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to determine the lag. 
Also, 𝛼𝑗 are heterogeneous intercepts across panels. The null is 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = ⋯ = 𝛽𝑛 = 0. If 
it is rejected, it says that at least one country in the panel holds PPP. 
1.4.1.2  Singular Unit Root Tests 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
unit root test follows the equation (1.7) below: 
 𝛥𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑟𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜗𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1
∆𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡 (1.7) 
 Here 𝑟𝑡 is real exchange rate, the variance of 𝜖𝑡 is 𝜎
2, and it follows 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑝 is the 
number of lags. Its null is 𝛽 = 0. If it is rejected, there is supportive evidence of PPP. 
Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS) Unit Root Test  In order to resolve 
the low test power of ADF unit root test, we also use the Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least 
Square (DF-GLS) with better test power that Elliott et al. (1996) suggest. The specification 
of DF-GLS is as follows: 
 
 ∆𝑞𝑡
∗ = 𝛼∗ + 𝛽∗𝑞𝑡−1













∗ is GLS demeaned real exchange rate (𝑟𝑡)
10, the variance of 𝜖𝑡
∗  is  𝜎∗2 , and it 
follows 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑝 is the number of lags. Its null is 𝛽∗ = 0. If it is rejected, it means that there 
is supportive evidence of PPP.  
When the lag length is too small, ADF test suffers from low test power (See Hall, 
1994; Ng et al., 1995), but the DF-GLS test suffers from size distortion (See Ng et al., 
2001). Offering a better combination of size and power, we use “general - to - specific” 
rule to determine lags for ADF test, following Hall (1994) and Ng et al. (1995), and the 
Modified Akaike Information Criterion (MAIC), following Ng et al. (2001) for DF-GLS 
unit root test.  
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) Unit Root Test Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) unit root test analyzes whether a time series variable does not contain 
a unit root, testing the null of stationarity. KPSS unit root test assumes we can decompose 
the series into the sum of a deterministic trend, a random walk, and a stationary error as 
follows:  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜉𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡 + 𝑡 (1.9) 
Where 𝑟𝑡 is a random walk 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 (1.10) 
Where 𝑢𝑡 follows 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. (0,  𝜎𝑢
2)  
The initial value  𝑟0 is treated as fixed and serves as an intercept. Real exchange 
rate does not have time trend under PPP, so 𝜉 is zero. Since  𝑡 is a stationary error, the 
                                                 





null hypothesis is that 𝑦𝑡 is stationary when 𝜎𝑢
2 = 0. Accordingly, the null hypothesis for 
the KPSS is 𝜎𝑢
2 = 011. If its null is rejected, PPP is not supportive.  
1.4.2  Data 
To construct real exchange rates between South Korea and its FTA partners, we 
utilize consumer price index (CPI, 2015=100), and producer price index (PPI, 2015=100) 
as price level. For exchange rate of FTA partners against South Korea, we use average 
period nominal exchange rate against U.S. dollar and calculate cross rate with this. We use 
International Financial Statistics (http://data.imf.org) and Organization For Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) statistics (http://stats.oecd.org/) to obtain aggregate 
price indices and average nominal exchange rate against U.S. dollar. We use disaggregate 
CPI (2015=100) classified by the classification of individual consumption by purpose 
(COICOP). We have the data from each FTA partner's Department of Statistics or 
comparable agency website12.We select the most highly tradable goods: Food, Footwear, 
Clothing, Alcoholic Beverages, Non-alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. However, there is 
limited availability of disaggregate consumer price index across countries13, and thus we 
                                                 




2 is the partial 
sum of deviations of residuals from the sample mean, 𝑆2(𝑙) is a consistent estimator of the 
long run variance (𝜎2) of the regression error, 𝑙 is a lag truncation parameter. To avoid size 
problem, we need to choose lag and kernel. We use “automatic bandwidth” for the lag, and 
“Quadratic Spectral Kernel” for the kernel. Andrews (1991) and Newey et al. (1994) argue 
that “Quadratic Spectral Kernel” yields more accurate estimates of long run variance (𝜎2) 
than other kernels, e.g., the Bartlett kernel employed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). In 
addition, Hobijn et al. (2004) find that the combination of the automatic bandwidth 
selection option and the quadratic spectral kernel yields the best test performance from 
Monte Carlo Simulations. See Andrews (1991), Hobijn et al. (2004) and Newey et al. 
(1994) for detail. 
12 Please see Appendix B for more information. 
13  Singapore does not provide separate disaggregate CPI not only for Clothing and 





investigate the effects of FTA on PPP with disaggregate CPI only for the selected six items 
for five FTA partners: Germany, Norway, Singapore, Turkey and the U.S. We use monthly 
data over the sample periods from January, 1998 to November, 201714. 
1.5  Empirical Results  
Although IPS panel unit root test cannot identify which FTA partner that PPP may 
hold with South Korea, it may be useful to perform IPS panel unit root test since IPS panel 
unit root test has higher test power than standard singular unit root tests, particularly ADF 
test. We perform this test to study whether FTA has positive influences on PPP regardless 
of countries and goods. After IPS panel unit root test, we use all three singular unit root 
tests for both pre-and post- FTA to find which FTA partner or which good market that FTA 
has positive impacts on PPP for.  
1.5.1  Aggregate Price Indices  
1.5.1.1  IPS Panel Unit Root Test Results  
Table 1.6 displays the IPS panel unit root test results from aggregate CPI and PPI. 
Both CPI and PPI support PPP for pre-FTA while only PPI supports PPP for post- FTA. 
Although PPI supports PPP for post-FTA, we cannot determine whether the supportive 
                                                 
disaggregate CPI for Food, Clothing and Footwear, Non-Alcoholic Beverages, Alcoholic 
Beverages and Tobacco. Also, Chile only provides disaggregate data from January, 2009; 
thus, we cannot use this to analyze the effects of FTA on PPP since KOR-Chile FTA is in 
effect in April, 2004 






evidence of PPP results from FTA since PPP between South Korea and its FTA partners is 
supported for both pre- and post- FTA. 
1.5.1.2  Singular Unit Root Test Results  
For the unit root tests with the null of non-stationarity - ADF and DF-GLS unit root 
test, ADF test has low test power; thus DF-GLS unit root test can be used to test whether 
PPP holds when ADF test does not find supportive evidence of PPP since it has higher test 
power than ADF unit root test. For this reason, we apply the ADF unit root test, first, and 
then the DF-GLS unit root test for countries with no supportive evidence for PPP from 
ADF unit root test. As Choi (2004) and Henricsson et al. (1995) did, we also use KPSS 
unit root test to see whether the stationarity of real exchange rate is robust.  
Table 1.7 shows all three-singular unit root test results from aggregate CPI. For pre-
FTA, ADF test supports PPP for Indonesia, KPSS test supports PPP for Norway; however, 
countries other than these two countries do not display supportive evidence of PPP 
regardless of unit root tests. For post-FTA, we find supportive evidence of PPP for Peru 
from DF-GLS unit root test; however, all three-unit root tests do not support PPP for other 
FTA partners.  
Table 1.8 displays the stationarity of real exchange rates from all three singular unit 
root tests from aggregate PPI. For pre-FTA, ADF unit root test supports PPP for Singapore, 
but not for the other countries. KPSS unit root test supports PPP for the U.S. For post- FTA, 
ADF unit root test does not support PPP for all FTA partners; however, supportive evidence 





 Through various unit root tests, panel or singular unit root test, and unit root test 
with the two opposite nulls- non-stationarity versus stationarity, we find limited evidence 
for the positive FTA impacts on PPP as shown in Table 1.6 - Table 1.8. 
1.5.2  Disaggregate Price Indices  
The reason we do not find supportive evidence of PPP in Section 1.5.1 may center 
around our use of aggregate price indices. As some studies argue, aggregate price indices 
include non-tradable goods; potentially affecting PPP not holding. Therefore, we analyze 
whether FTA has positive influences on PPP, using disaggregate CPI for six highly tradable 
goods: food, alcoholic beverage, non-alcoholic beverage, clothing, tobacco and footwear.  
1.5.2.1  IPS panel unit root test  
For IPS panel unit root test with disaggregate CPI, the panel of each county includes 
all six highly tradable goods. Unlike our expectation, we find more supportive evidence of 
PPP for pre-FTA than post-FTA (Table 1.9). Although we find supportive evidence of PPP 
for Turkey and the U.S. for post- FTA, it is difficult to argue the positive effects of FTA 
on PPP for them as we also find supportive evidence of PPP for pre-FTA. 
1.5.2.2  Singular unit root tests  
Table 1.10 - Table 1.14 delineate ADF, DF-GLS and KPSS unit root test results 
across goods and countries. We also find limited evidence on the positive impacts of FTA 
on PPP from disaggregate CPI.  
For pre-FTA, ADF unit root test supports PPP for alcoholic beverage and tobacco 





supports PPP for footwear for Turkey, for food, non-alcoholic beverage, clothing and 
footwear for Germany, and for non-alcoholic beverage and alcoholic beverage for Norway.  
For post- FTA, there is limited supportive evidence of PPP for most six goods 
across countries. Our findings display supportive evidence of PPP for the U.S., but not for 
other FTA partners. KPSS unit root test supports PPP for food, non-alcoholic beverage, 
alcoholic beverage and footwear for the U.S. PPP for only footwear for the U.S. is strongly 
supported by both two different types of unit root tests- ADF and KPSS unit root test. 
1.6  Why does PPP not hold between South Korea and its FTA partners for 
post-FTA?  
Despite a decrease or elimination of tariffs and an increase in trade volume after 
FTA, there is limited supportive evidence of PPP for post-FTA between South Korea and 
its FTA partners. Our findings imply other factors than a decrease in tariffs may matter for 
PPP. There are five possible explanations for why there is limited supportive evidence of 
PPP between South Korea and its FTA partners after FTA.  
First, even after FTA, there are still non-tariffs between South Korea and its FTA 
partners such as rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules, antidumping and 
so on. These may exert a stronger effect on PPP than a decline or an elimination of tariffs.  
Second, the volatility of nominal exchange rate may play a stronger role in 
determining whether PPP holds than trade barriers. Table 1.15 delineates the change in 
volatility of nominal exchange rate after FTA. The volatility of nominal exchange rate for 
some countries such as Singapore, India and Norway, significantly, has increased after 





on PPP than trade barriers. Their findings may provide some explanation for our findings 
of a lack of supportive evidence of PPP for post-FTA for Singapore, India and Norway. 
Third, heterogeneous productivity levels between South Korea and its FTA partners 
may support our findings. According to Balassa and Samuelson effects (see Balassa (1964) 
and Samuelson (1964)), the different productivity levels across countries may result in no 
supportive evidence of PPP. As shown in Table 1.16, there is a large difference in 
productivity level between South Korea and its FTA partners. Even though FTA allows for 
free movement of goods between countries, labor does not move freely, resulting in labor 
market segmentation, which may cause a lack of support for PPP. 
Fourth, exporters charge different prices across countries because export demand 
elasticity for most products, and local costs, such as distribution costs or local taxes, vary 
by country. This is called “Pricing to Market ”. Different local costs and demand elasticity 
for a good that South Korea exporters or its FTA partners might face can affect the rejection 
of LOP or PPP. 
Fifth, model misspecification used in this study may be another explanation for our 
findings. Many studies do not consider trade costs when they test LOP or PPP; however, 
some studies (e.g., Dumas, 1992; Obstfeld et al., 1997; Sercu et al., 1995 ) argue that trade 
costs should be considered when PPP or LOP is tested because LOP or PPP is based on 
arbitrage. Non-linearity of price differential may arise depending on whether trade costs 
are larger or smaller than price differentials. We may need to incorporate non-linearity of 
price differential in testing PPP. For this, it may be better to employ non-linear models (e.g. 





non-linearity of price differential behavior, which may cause limited supportive evidence 
of PPP after FTA between South Korea and its FTA partners. 
1.7  Conclusion  
Although LOP or PPP is a building block of international economics and finance 
theories, there is limited supportive evidence of LOP or PPP. In this study, we explore 
whether a decline in tariffs matters for PPP from evidence of South Korea’s FTA. When 
FTA is in effect among member countries, tariffs among them would be eliminated or 
reduced. It may result in a decline in trade barriers and an increase in trade volumes among 
them; thus, more supportive evidence of PPP may be expected between South Korea and 
its FTA partners for post-FTA.  
Although the tariffs on almost seventy percentage of imports for both South Korea 
and its FTA partners have been eliminated or decreased at the FTA effective year, and trade 
volumes among them have increased after FTA, we find limited evidence for the positive 
impacts of FTA on PPP between them. Our findings imply factors other than a decline in 
tariffs; i.e., the volatility of nominal exchange rates, non-tariffs, heterogeneous 
productivity across countries may exert stronger roles in PPP.  
By testing whether PPP holds between South Korea and its FTA partners after FTA, 
we expect to answer whether FTA has enhanced market integration between South Korea 
and its FTA partners. However, the presence of other factors affecting PPP may limit our 
ability to see market integration between South Korea and its FTA partners by testing PPP.  
Accordingly, our findings demonstrate that testing PPP may not be a good way to 





FTA has enhanced market integration between South Korea and its FTA partners. 
Generally, we may say that market integration across countries would be achieved when 
trade barriers have declined among them. A decline in trade barriers may causes increase 
in trade volumes, so trade costs would be lowered when countries are integrated. We may 
explore whether trade costs have declined after FTA to see whether FTA has enhanced 


















    Table 1.1 South Korea’s FTA partners and FTA Effective Dates  
 










Chile  2004.04.01  Singapore  2006.03.02  India  2010.01.01  
Peru  2011.08.01  U.S.  2012.03.15  Turkey  2013.05.01  
Australia  2014.12.12  Canada  2015.01.01  China  2015.12.20  
New Zealand  2015.12.20  Vietnam  2015.12.20  Colombia  2016.07.15  










EFTA(4)  2006.09.01  ASEAN(10)  2007.06.01  EU(28)  2011.07.01  







      Table 1.2 Tariff Elimination Schedules: FTAs by country  
 
FTA Countries 
% of Imports that Tariffs 
Eliminated (year 0) 
FTA Countries 
% of Imports that Tariffs 
Eliminated (year 0) 
KOR-Chile 
South Korea  87.2%  
KOR- India  
South Korea  
8 years for zero tariffs  
Chile  41.8%  India  
KOR- Singapore 
South Korea  59.7%  
KOR-Peru  
South Korea  85.54%  
Singapore  100%  Peru  67.86%  
KOR-the U.S. 
South Korea  80.0%  
KOR- Turkey  
South Korea  80.0%  







KOR- Australia  
South Korea  75.2%  
KOR- Canada  
South Korea  81.9%  
Australia  90.9%  Canada  76.4%  
KOR- China  
South Korea  49.9%  
KOR- New Zealand  
South Korea  48.3%  
China  20.1%  New Zealand  92.0%  
KOR- Vietnam  
South Korea  91.3%  
KOR-Colombia  
South Korea  82.38%  
Vietnam  86.3%  Colombia  60.64%  







        Table 1.3 Tariff Elimination Schedules: FTAs by trade blocs 
 
FTA  Countries  % of Imports that Tariffs Eliminated (year 0)  
KOR-EFTA  
South Korea  86.3%  
EFTA  100%( excluding agricultural products)  
KOR-ASEAN  
South Korea  70%  
ASEAN  
Decrease in Tariffs on 50% of total imports 
by 0-5%  
KOR-EU  
South Korea  81.7%  
EU  76.6%  












     Table 1.4 Trade Openness: Pre-and Post-FTA  
 
FTAs by country 
FTA partners  Pre-FTA  Post-FTA  % Change  
Chile  0.26  0.53  107.73  
Singapore  1.41  2.12  49.87  
India  0.77  1.39  80.73  
Peru  0.10  0.22  128.58  
U.S.  9.09  8.09  -11.03  
Turkey  0.31  0.49  57.42  
FTAs by trade blocs 
FTA partners  Pre-FTA  Post-FTA  % Change  
Norway (KOR⋅EFTAFTA)  0.17  0.41  141.18  





Indonesia (KOR⋅ASEAN FTA)  1.37  1.79  30.66  
    Note 1. Trade openness is calculated by dividing trade volumes (exports + imports)  
               by South Korea nominal GDP and calculate their average for each period. 














































     Table 1.5 Change in Real Exchange Rate Volatility: Pre-and Post FTA  
 
FTAs by country 
FTA partners  Pre-FTA  Post-FTA  †F-test (p-value)  
Chile  0.19  0.12  0.00  
Singapore  0.20  0.11  0.00  
India  0.11  0.05  0.00  
Peru  0.15  0.06  0.00  
U.S.  0.11  0.04  0.00  
Turkey  0.18  0.09  0.00  
FTAs by trade blocs  
FTA partners  Pre-FTA  Post-FTA  †F-test (p-value)  
Norway (KOR⋅EFTAFTA)  0.10  0.14  0.00  
Germany (KOR⋅EUFTA)  0.11  0.08  0.00  
Indonesia (KOR⋅ASEAN FTA)  0.13  0.11  0.01  
     𝐻0:   Average 𝑉𝑜𝑙








    Table 1.6 IPS Panel Unit Root Test Results from Aggregate Price Indices  
 
Price Index  Pre-FTA  Post-FTA  
CPI  -4.85 ***  -0.70  
PPI  -3.60 ***  -1.60 **  
    Note: 1. All the figures represent 𝑊?̅? statistics.  
























         Table 1.7 Singular Unit Root Test Results (CPI)  
 
FTAs by country 
Country  
H0: I(1)  H0: I(0)  
ADF  DF-GLS  KPSS  
Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  Pre-FTA  Post- FTA  Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  
Chile  -2.50(2) -1.75 (1) 0.32 (2) -1.17 (3) 1.69 (3) *** 0.99 (2) *** 
Singapore  -2.33 (2) -2.15 (2) 1.28 (1) -0.32 (2) 2.04 (3) *** 1.63 (3) *** 
India  -1.68 (8) -1.63 (2) -0.80 (2) -1.85 (2) 0.57 (3) ** 0.60 (3) ** 
Peru  -2.80 (2) -1.50 (2) -0.49 (2) -2.06 (8) ** 0.75 (3) *** 1.37 (3) *** 







Turkey  -1.10 (5) -1.92 (1) -1.20 (8) 0.28 (1) 3.30 (3) *** 1.78 (2) *** 
FTAs by trade blocs 
Country  
H0: I(1)  H0: I(0)  
ADF  DF-GLS  KPSS  
Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  Pre-FTA  Post- FTTA  Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  
Germany  -1.93 (1)  -1.82 (1)  -1.72 (1)  -0.81 (1)  1.19 (3) *** 1.63 (3) ***  
Norway  -2.79 (2)  -0.48 (2)  -0.21 (2)  -0.66 (2)  0.33 (3)  2.00 (3) ***  
Indonesia  -3.34 (8) ***  -1.84 (1)  -  -0.96 (1)  0.87 (3) ***  0.75 (3) ***  
         Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05 
                   2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively. 
                   3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995)  for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS,  









          Table 1.8 Singular Unit Root Test Results (PPI)  
 
FTAs by country 
Country  
H0: I(1)  H0: I(0)  
ADF  DF-GLS  KPSS  
Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  Pre-FTA  Post- FTA  Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  
Chile  N/A  -1.32 (9)  N/A  0.03 (9)  N/A  1.60 (3) ***  
Singapore  -2.98 (5) **  -1.43 (1)  -  -0.83 (2)  0.62 (3) **  0.78 (3) ***  
India  -2.71 (1)  -1.63 (2)  -1.11(1)  -1.01 (2)  0.61 (3) **  1.49 (3) ***  
Peru  -2.75 (1)  -2.56 (1)  0.86 (2)  -2.23 (3) **  0.61 (3) **  1.00 (3) ***  







Turkey  -1.02 (5)  -2.01 (1)  -1.43 (5)  -0.34 (1)  3.49 (3) ***  1.52 (2) ***  
FTAs by trade blocs 
Country  
H0: I(1)  H0: I(0)  
ADF  DF-GLS  KPSS  
Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  Pre-FTA  Post- FTA  Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  
Germany  -1.48 (1)  -2.11 (1)  -1.81 (1)  -1.10 (2)  2.28 (3) ***  1.44 (3) ***  
Norway  -0.14(8)  -1.39 (1)  -0.84 (8)  -0.46 (1)  1.45 (3) ***  0.78 (3) ***  
Indonesia  -2.75 (2)  -2.50 (1)  0.39 (2)  0.29 (1)  1.62 (3) ***  0.84 (3) ***  
            Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05 
                      2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively. 
                      3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS, 





   Table 1.9 Im-Pesaran-Shin Panel Unit Root Test Results from disaggregate CPIs  
 
FTA partners  Pre-FTA  Post-FTA  FTA partners  Pre-FTA  Post-FTA  
Singapore  -3.76 ***  -1.23  Germany  0.70  -1.05  
Turkey  -2.99 ***  -1.98 **  Norway  -4.91 ***  2.01  
U.S.  -2.89 ***  -3.13 ***   
    Note: 1. All the figures represent 𝑊?̅? statistics. 






















             Table 1.10 Singular Unit Root Test Results for Singapore  
 
Items  
H0: I(1)  H0: I(0)  
ADF  DF-GLS  KPSS  
Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  Pre-FTA  Post- FTA  Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  
Food  -2.29 (2)  -2.23 (2)  1.44 (2)  -0.48 (2)  2.20 (3)***  0.73 (3)***  
Non-Alcoholic Beverage  -2.34 (2)  -2.33 (1)  0.60 (1)  -0.86 (2)  1.44 (3)***  0.57 (3)***  
Alcoholic Beverage and Tobacco  -3.24 (1)**  -1.39 (2)  -  -0.99 (1)  0.53 (3)**  0.90 (3)***  
Clothing and Footwear  -1.37 (8)  -1.50 (2)  0.92 (9)  -1.05 (2)  1.92 (3)***  0.76 (3)***  
             Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05  
                       2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively. 
                       3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS, 












          Table 1.11 Singular Unit Root Test Results for Turkey  
Items  
H0: I(1)  H0: I(0)  
ADF  DF-GLS  KPSS  
Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  Pre-FTA  Post- FTA  Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  
Food  -1.65 (1)  -0.25 (7)  -1.09 (1)  0.88 (2)  0.91 (3) ***  1.82 (2) ***  
Non-Alcoholic Beverage  -1.55 (1)  -2.38 (1)  -1.44 (1)  -0.35 (1)  0.52 (3) **  1.42 (2) ***  
Alcoholic Beverage  -0.44 (2)  -2.15 (1)  0.68 (1)  -0.60 (1)  2.32 (3) ***  0.84 (2) ***  
Tobacco  -1.29 (2)  -1.50 (1)  0.90 (2)  -0.16 (1)  2.37 (3) ***  1.66 (2) ***  
Clothing  -1.58 (8)  -0.95 (8)  -0.63 (9)  0.94 (7)  0.56 (3) **  1.57 (2) ***  
Footwear  -2.29 (6)  -1.91 (6)  -1.42 (10)  0.15 (6)  0.39 (3)  1.62 (2) ***  
         Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05   2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively. 
                   3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS,  









           Table 1.12  Singular Unit Root Test Results for the U.S.  
Items  
H0: I(1)  H0: I(0)  
ADF  DF-GLS  KPSS  
Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  Pre-FTA  Post- FTA  Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  
Food  -2.40 (2)  -1.99 (2)  0.29 (2)  -1.67 (3)  2.57 (3) ***  0.36 (3)  
Non-Alcoholic Beverage  -1.74 (2)  -2.41 (1)  0.18 (2)  -0.98 (3)  2.88 (3) ***  0.25 (3)  
Alcoholic Beverage  -2.27 (3)  -2.46 (1)  -0.87 (3)  -1.25 (3)  0.45 (3) **  0.20 (3)  
Tobacco  -1.24 (8)  -1.42 (1)  -1.07 (1)  -0.95 (1)  0.75 (3) ***  1.39 (3) ***  
Clothing  -1.46 (6)  -1.61 (2)  0.57 (11)  -0.003 (3)  3.40 (3) ***  0.65 (3) **  
Footwear  -2.40 (3)  -3.42 (1) **  0.38 (12)  -  3.12 (3) ***  0.13 (3)  
           Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05  2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively. 
                     3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS,  








       Table 1.13  Singular Unit Root Test Results for Germany  
Items  
H0: I(1)  H0: I(0)  
ADF  DF-GLS  KPSS  
Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  Pre-FTA  Post- FTA  Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  
Food  -2.45 (2)  -2.37 (1)  -0.87 (3)  -1.01 (2)  0.22 (3)  1.39 (3) ***  
Non-Alcoholic Beverage  -2.24 (1)  -1.82 (1)  -1.47 (1)  -1.26 (1)  0.23 (3)  1.46 (3) ***  
Alcoholic Beverage  -1.49 (1)  -1.24 (5)  -1.77 (1)  -0.56 (1)  1.94 (3) ***  1.75 (3) ***  
Tobacco  -0.78 (2)  -1.20 (1)  -0.91 (2)  -0.68 (1)  2.39 (3) ***  1.57 (3) ***  
Clothing  -2.46 (5)  -1.76 (6)  -1.53 (1)  -0.76 (6)  0.28 (3)  1.70 (3) ***  
Footwear  -2.63 (3)  -1.92 (6)  -0.93 (2)  -0.99 (6)  0.30 (3)  1.52 (2) ***  
       Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05  2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively. 
                 3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS,  









     Table 1.14  Singular Unit Root Test Results for Norway  
Items  
H0: I(1)  H0: I(0)  
ADF  DF-GLS  KPSS  
Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  Pre-FTA  Post- FTA  Pre- FTA  Post-FTA  
Food  -2.94 (3) **  -0.01 (2)  -  -0.29 (2)  1.24 (3) ***  2.78 (3) ***  
Non-Alcoholic Beverage  -1.82 (6)  -0.52 (5)  -1.56 (1)  -1.39 (12)  0.28 (3)  1.91 (3) ***  
Alcoholic Beverage  -4.33 (1) **  -0.87 (1)  -  -0.72 (1)  0.32 (3)  1.13 (3) ***  
Clothing  -1.82 (8)  -0.27 (6)  1.06 (12)  -0.54 (12)  2.16 (3) ***  3.22 (3) ***  
Footwear  -2.26 (3)  -0.36 (6)  0.89 (12)  -0.53 (6)  2.06 (3) ***  2.67 (3) ***  
      Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05  2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively. 
                3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS, 






      Table 1.15 Change in Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility: Pre-and Post-FTA  
 
FTAs by country 
FTA partners  Pre-FTA  Post-FTA  †F-test (p-value)  
Chile  0.20  0.12  0.00  
Singapore  0.09  0.13  0.00  
India  0.12  0.15  0.03  
Peru  0.15  0.09  0.00  
U.S.  0.12  0.04  0.00  
Turkey  0.60  0.19  0.00  
FTAs by trade blocs 
FTA partners  Pre-FTA  Post-FTA  †F-test (p-value)  
Norway (KOR⋅EFTAFTA)  0.11  0.15  0.00  
Germany (KOR⋅EUFTA)  0.15  0.08  0.00  
Indonesia (KOR⋅ASEAN FTA)  0.15  0.17  0.41  
        † 𝐻0:  Average 𝑉𝑜𝑙







       Table 1.16 Heterogeneous Productivity Level Between South Korea and Its FTA 
                           Partners 
 
Country  
GDP per capita relative  
to South Korea  
Country  
GDP per capita relative  
to South Korea  
South Korea  100  Turkey  67.27  
Chile  62.44  U.S.  151.01  
Singapore  229.69  Indonesia  31.47  
India  18.27  Norway  179.19  
Peru  33.75  Germany  127.41  
       Source: the world factbook (https://www.cia.gov) 



























CHAPTER 2  FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MARKET INTEGRATION: 
EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH KOREA15 
 
2.1  Introduction  
Over the last thirty years, the pace of removal of barriers to international exchange 
has increased, especially in developing and emerging market countries. For many countries 
nowadays, protectionist trade policies have been supplanted with trade-liberalizing policies 
as way to promote market integration and encourage economic growth. South Korea is a 
case in point.  
South Korea is a country that has a high dependency on foreign trade. Exports plus 
imports are almost 70 percent of GDP revealing that international trade is crucial to the 
South Korean economy. At present, South Korea has signed free trade agreements (FTAs) 
with fifty-two countries. Whether or not these agreements have intensified market 
integration in South Korea is an open question. Our paper fills this gap.  
Numerous studies examine the degree of market integration by asking whether the 
differential between home and foreign prices is persistent or tends to dissipate over time16. 
A handful of studies focus on whether free trade agreements or other market integration 
                                                 
15Lim, E.S. and J.B. Breuer. Submitted to Journal of International Money and Finance,  
   09/2017 
16 Studies include Moosa et al. (1997); Chinn (1997); Goldberg et al. (1997); Krueger 
(1997); Laureti (2001); Goldberg et al. (2005); Lee (2010); and Ogrokhina (2015). 




efforts have led to an increased pace of dissipation. Nearly all of these studies assess market 
integration by testing if the Law of One Price, or its aggregated version Purchasing Power 
Parity, holds, using unit root tests. Support for market integration is found if a unit root in 
the home-foreign price differential can be rejected, implying that home and foreign prices 
converge over time. Evidence from these studies is mixed. 
We look at a more natural question about market integration: Have trade costs 
associated with the arbitrage of goods declined after the passage of free trade agreements? 
We study nine of fifteen South Korea's free trade agreements. Few studies examine the 
impact of free trade agreements on market integration from this angle. Our paper adds to 
this literature.  
We use Heckscher (1916)'s commodity points model as a framework for examining 
international arbitrage in goods with trade costs. The role of trade costs in arbitrage has 
been a missing element in many studies of the Law of One Price and Purchasing Power 
Parity17. In an arbitrage model, the identified threshold delineates the ‘trade' and ‘no trade' 
zones and gives a measure of the size of trade costs. 
While self-exciting TAR models have largely been used to study the behavior of 
the home-foreign price differential inside and outside the ‘no trade' zone in making claims 
about market integration, we instead use these models to study the size of trade costs. 
Because we are interested in the effects of free trade agreements on trade costs, we 
incorporate a novel feature into the TAR: a structural break in the threshold at a point in 
time. In our paper, the time-break occurs at the free trade agreement date. To the best of 
                                                 
17 Exceptions include Davutyan et al. (1985), Obstfeld et al. (1997), Michael et al. (1997), 
and Sarno et al. (2004). 




our knowledge, the strategy we propose for testing for whether there is a time-break in the 
threshold has not been considered elsewhere. There is a long literature on discontinuous 
TAR models and smoothed variants like the STAR, ESTAR, and LSTAR model which all 
incorporate threshold effects. Some papers acknowledge that thresholds may change, yet, 
none that we are aware of introduce and test for a time-break in the threshold. Jacks et al. 
(2017) estimate different silver point thresholds over three periods in the early 1900s but 
do not test for whether the thresholds are different. Cho et al. (2014) allow for different 
thresholds based on a trade-intensity measure using an exponential smooth-transition 
autogressive model to test purchasing power parity. Pavlidis et al. (2011) estimate an 
ESTAR model that allows for time-varying trade costs, measured not by the threshold, but 
rather by a variable constructed to capture trade costs. Blavy et al. (2009) allow for 
differences in thresholds across commodity types between the United States and its two 
NAFTA partners - Canada and Mexico.18 Canjels et al. (2004) allow for smooth trend 
change in gold point thresholds.  
The strategy for testing for a time-broken threshold that we offer has two basic 
steps: (1) testing for a TAR model over the full sample period, as well as the sub-periods 
demarcated by the FTA event, against a linear autoregressive model using the method of 
Hansen (1997) and Hansen (2000). Because of the nuisance parameter problem that arises 
with TAR models, a bootstrapped distribution of Wald test statistics must be generated for 
evaluating the null hypothesis. Conditional on the findings in the first step, the second step 
relies on a conventional Wald test: testing the full-sample unbroken TAR model against a 
                                                 
18 They also test whether a TAR model provides a better fit than an AR(p) model in both 
the pre- and post-FTA subsamples. They, however, do not test whether allowing for a break 
at the FTA date provides a better fit than an unbroken TAR model. 




time-broken threshold model constructed from joining the estimated piece-wise sub-period 
models before and after the FTA. Because a threshold has been identified in the prior step, 
the Wald test, in this case, is free of the nuisance parameter problem and bootstrapping a 
distribution of Wald statistics is not required. Using this strategy yields a test for 
differences in trade costs before and after free trade agreements between South Korea and 
its trading partners. We also report whether the price gap erodes more quickly outside the 
band of inaction after the free trade agreement. 
Estimation of our model yields two findings. First, we find that the adoption of 
FTAs has reduced trade costs between South Korea and several of the FTA partners we 
study. The decline in trade costs differs by country, with some seeing a decline in trade 
costs of 50 percent or more. This finding suggests that free trade agreements promote 
market integration. Second, for those countries where FTAs have led to lower trade costs, 
we report mixed and admittedly cursory evidence on whether the speed of mean reversion 
in the home-foreign price differential has become faster outside the band of inaction after 
the FTA. We caution the use of these latter findings on home-foreign price convergence to 
impute evidence for or against market integration. We conclude that tests of whether 
market integration intensifies after a free trade agreement are best studied with a focus on 
the impact of whether FTAs lead to a decline in trade costs. 
We have organized the remainder of the paper as follows: Section 2.2 discusses 
market integration and South Korea's FTAs. Section 2.3 introduces a simple arbitrage 
model of trade with and without costs and with and without the effect of a free trade 
agreement. Section 2.4 describes the data, the estimation strategy, and the results. Section 
2.5 concludes. 




2.2  South Korea's Free Trade Agreements 
2.2.1  Market Integration  
The main reason countries desire market integration is a belief that market 
integration enhances prospects for sustained economic growth. Market integration is 
expected to foster increased competition and specialization as countries engage in trade 
with each other. Free trade agreements are expected to initiate a virtuous cycle of market 
integration by first reducing or eliminating costs associated with tariffs and external 
barriers to trade. Then, as these costs are eliminated, increased opportunities for 
international trade will intensify competition and enlarge economies of scope and scale. 
These market-driven changes are expected to exert downward pressure on the costs of 
trade. Such costs may come in a variety of forms: transportation, insurance, paperwork, 
dealing with language barriers, or costs associated with avoiding exchange rate volatility, 
to name a few19. Market-driven changes are also expected to reduce the gap between cross-
border differences in the prices of goods. Both of these changes further the process of 
market integration, setting the stage for faster economic growth and even stronger market 
integration20. 
In order to harmonize markets across countries and reap the benefits of 
specialization and competition, many countries have lowered trade barriers through signing 
multilateral agreements such as GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and 
WTO (World Trade Organization) Rounds. Both GATT and WTO Rounds have helped in 
                                                 
19 See O'Connell and Wei (2002) for further discussion. 
20 There are many facets to market integration. Balassa (1961) and Wood (1979) provide a 
history of thought on the meaning of “economic integration.” 




reducing trade barriers among countries, but they are not as efficient as bilateral and 
regional trade agreements because the interests of many countries must be considered. As 
a result, there has been a proliferation of regional free trade agreements worldwide. South 
Korea is not alone in this endeavor. 
2.2.2  Free Trade Agreements between South Korea and its FTA partners 
South Korea has twelve bilateral FTAs and three multilateral FTAs covering fifty-
two countries21.Table 2.1 shows the two types of FTAs and the dates the FTAs became 
effective22. South Korea's first FTA was with Chile in 2004 and the latest five FTAs – with 
Canada, China, New Zealand, Vietnam, and Colombia – were all signed in 2015 or later. 
There have been no new free trade agreements with trade blocs in force since 201123. 
Tables 2.2 - Table 2.3 display the percentage of imports with tariffs that have been 
eliminated for both South Korea and its free trade partners when the FTAs went into effect. 
Although tariffs on all imports are not eliminated immediately, tariffs are eliminated on 70 
percent of imports on average in the first year of the FTA.  
As tariffs between South Korea and its FTA partners are reduced, it is anticipated 
that trade volumes will rise. Appendix C reports the trade volumes - before and after the 
FTA - for each free trade partner. In nearly all cases, the free trade partners had a very 
small share of overall trade volume with South Korea at less than 1 percent of GDP. After 
                                                 
21 Singapore and Vietnam have both a bilateral FTA with Korea and they are also part of  
    ASEAN FTA partners. 
22 The data source for Tables 2.1 -2.3 is http://www.customs.go.kr. 
23 South Korea is currently negotiating bilateral FTAs with Israel and several multilateral 
FTAs: South Korea-China-Japan FTA, and the Central American FTA with Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.  




the free trade agreements by country, South Korea's trade volumes with its FTA partner 
countries increased over 60 percent. However, after FTA with trade blocs, the effect on 
trade volumes was much more varied: trade volume with some partner countries rose over 
50 percent while for other partner countries, there were declines. 
Rising trade volumes, however, are not sufficient evidence that greater market 
integration has been achieved. Cross-border trade flows may increase because of trend 
exchange rate movements or rising incomes, unrelated to the free trade agreements. 
Stronger support that greater market integration has occurred should be observed in a 
reduction in the costs associated with trade and the gap between cross-border prices of 
similar goods. We turn to this next. 
2.2.3  An Arbitrage Model of Trade with Costs 
We use Heckscher (1916)'s commodity points model of arbitrage to explore the 
effects of free trade agreements on market integration. To lay the foundation, we first derive 
the model assuming trade costs TC=0. We then incorporate trade costs and derive the band 
of inaction. We assume two countries – the home country (South Korea) and the foreign 
country (free trade partner) – engage in trade with each other. Further, we assume they can 
each produce and sell all the same goods.  
The condition establishing when the home country will export good j to the foreign 
country at time t is given by: 
 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡
∗   (2.1) 




and the condition establishing when the home country will import good j from the foreign 
country is given by: 
 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 > 𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡
∗   (2.2) 
where 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 is the price of home good 𝑗 in home currency at time 𝑡 and 𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡
∗  is the price of 
foreign good 𝑗 expressed in the home country currency: 𝑠𝑡  is the exchange rate at time 
𝑡 expressed as home currency per unit of foreign currency and 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
∗  is foreign currency price 
of foreign good 𝑗.  





∗ = 1  (2.3) 
Thus, arbitrage will lead to convergence in home and foreign prices; that is, the 
relative home-foreign price ratio will approach 1.0.  
What happens when trade costs 𝑇𝐶 – expressed as a percentage of home or foreign 
prices – are introduced? The condition for home country export is now: 
 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡
∗ (1 + 𝑇𝐶)  (2.4) 
and the condition for home country import is now: 
 
 𝑝𝑗,𝑡(1 + 𝑇𝐶) < 𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡
∗   (2.5) 
Combining the two inequalities defines the ‘band of inaction', where no trade occurs: 










∗ < (1 + 𝑇𝐶)  (2.6) 
Here, we have two thresholds, the lower (
1
1+𝑇𝐶
) and the upper (1 + 𝑇𝐶). These are the 
“trade points.” These points are assumed to be symmetric in costs and time-invariant24. 
In the inner regime defined by equation (2.6), arbitrage is not profitable for either 
the home country or the foreign country because the costs associated with trade exceed the 
price differential. Hence, there will be no trade; 
𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡
∗  is not expected to converge to 1.0. 
However, in the two “outer regimes” – above the upper threshold or below the lower 
threshold – arbitrage takes place until the home-foreign price differential converges to 
either the upper or lower threshold where trade ceases to be profitable25. 
To provide clarity and consistency between the arbitrage model and the empirical 
model below, we adapt the arbitrage model in several ways. First, we define the regime 
conditions in log terms where 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑗,𝑡) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡
∗ ) – is the log of the home-




Now, define 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 as deviations 𝑟𝑗,𝑡from its mean. In the theoretical case, the mean of 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 is 
zero and so 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 =  𝑟𝑗,𝑡. 
In the inner regime, 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 satisfies: 
 −𝑐 < 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑐  (2.7) 
   
                                                 
24 See Sercu et al. (1995) and Prakash et al. (1997). 
25 Sercu et al. (1995) and O'Connell (1998) argue arbitrage will persist until the price 
differential converges to the trade point thresholds. 








  (2.8) 
Heckscher (1916)'s model provides a proposition about the behavior of 𝑞𝑗,𝑡- the 
demeaned home-foreign price differential for good j - in the inner and outer regimes. In the 
inner regime, 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 may behave as a random walk, i.e. contain a unit root, due to the absence 
of arbitrage. In the outer regime where arbitrage pressures arise, 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 will move toward 𝑐 
when it is above the upper edge of the band and toward −𝑐 when it is below the lower edge 
of the band. Thus, 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 will revert toward the thresholds over time. Figure 2.1 illustrates. 
Inside the band of inaction where there is no arbitrage 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 is a random walk; outside the 
bands, 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 converges to |𝑐|. 
We incorporate one additional feature into the arbitrage model with trade costs: an 
assumption that the thresholds may change after the adoption of free trade agreements. 
Thus, we introduce a break in the thresholds [𝑐, −𝑐] at period 𝜏. The introduction of a 
threshold break into (2.7) and (2.8) can be expressed as: 
 −𝑐𝜏 < 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑐







  (2.10) 
 
where 𝜏 = 𝑎, 𝑏. and 𝑎 = 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 FTA and 𝑏 = 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 FTA.  




In theory, free trade agreements will lower the costs of trade and narrow the band 
of inaction. That is, |𝑐𝑎| < |𝑐𝑏|. A secondary outcome is that in the outer regime, reversion 
to the thresholds [𝑐𝜏, −𝑐𝜏]  may be faster after the free trade agreement. Figure 2.2 
illustrates. These are empirical questions which we turn to shortly. 
2.4  Data, Estimation Strategy, and Empirical Results 
We introduce the data we use to study the effects of free trade agreements on market 
integration below. Then, we turn to a discussion of the estimation strategy for a self-
exciting TAR model without a threshold break and present the empirical results. We then 
adapt the estimation strategy to include a break in the threshold at the FTA date and present 
the results. 
2.4.1  Data 
Our data on prices and exchange rates comes from the IMF's International Financial 
Statistics database. We lack disaggregated data on prices 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
∗  and instead use an 
aggregated price index. We use the consumer price index (CPI) where 𝑝𝑡 is the CPI for 
South Korea and 𝑝𝑡
∗  is the CPI for the FTA partner we study. To convert 𝑝𝑡
∗  to home 
currency for each FTA partner, we construct 𝑠𝑡 as the Korean won per unit of the FTA 
partner currency. These cross rates are calculated using nominal dollar-based exchange 
rates for South Korea and the FTA partners. The (aggregate) home-foreign price 
differential between South Korea and each of the nine FTA partners is defined as  




𝑟𝑡 = log(𝑝𝑡) − log (𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑡
∗) and where 𝑞𝑡 is the demeaned value of 𝑟𝑡26.  
We have monthly data covering the period January 1998 - April 201727.The sample 
period start date corresponds to the commencement of the floating exchange rate period in 
South Korea, after the Asian Financial Crisis. Our choice of free trade agreements for 
inclusion in our study was motivated by sample size considerations. We want to have a 
minimum of 45 observations on either side of the free trade agreement. Therefore, we 
selected the six FTAs by country with the earliest start dates as reported earlier in Table 
2.1: Chile (2004), Singapore (2006), India (2010), Peru (2011), United States (2012) and 
Turkey (2013). For the three FTAs by trade blocs, we are limited to study the three 
operative agreements: EFTA (2006), ASEAN (2007), and EU (2011). Given that there are 
forty-two countries across the three FTA by trade blocs, we choose to study the country 
with the highest trade volume from each of the three agreements. From the EFTA, we chose 
Norway, from the ASEAN agreement, Indonesia, and from the EU, Germany. In all, there 
are nine countries in our study. 
2.4.2  Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregressive Model without a Threshold 
Break 
We begin by estimating the arbitrage model with trade costs from Section 3 using 
a self-exciting Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) Model assuming no break in the threshold. 
A TAR model explicitly allows for differences in the behavior of a time series variable 
                                                 
26 The demeaned real exchange rate is used since it takes out the influence of base year 
effects in the aggregate price indices. 𝑞𝑡 estimated as the residual in a regression of 𝑟𝑡 on a 
constant. 
27 The start date for Germany is one year later. 




relative to one or more thresholds and naturally accommodates piece-wise non-linearities 
that are induced by the presence of trade costs.  
As in Sarno et al. (2004), we assume the convergence rate of 𝑞𝑡 is symmetric above 
and below the threshold. In a TAR model, assignment of 𝑞𝑡 to the inner regime or the outer 
regime is based on an indicator function that determines the regime. The indicator function 
for a self-exciting TAR is a d-period lag of 𝑞𝑡 relative to the threshold c. This captures 𝑑-
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 stickiness in prices arising from contracts. 
By assuming symmetry in the behavior of 𝑞𝑡 outside the upper and lower threshold 
along with symmetry in the upper and lower thresholds, the two outer regimes can be 
treated as a single “outer regime” defined by c. Thus, it is convenient to write the indicator 
function using the absolute value of 𝑞𝑡−𝑑 relative to c. If |𝑞𝑡−𝑑| > 𝑐, we let the indicator 
function I(|qt−d| > c) = 1 and assign 𝑞𝑡 to the outer regime. When the condition is not 
satisfied, I(|qt−d| > c) = 0 and 𝑞𝑡 is assigned to the inner regime. 
Before we consider the effects of free trade agreements on trade costs, we need to 
first ascertain whether trade costs exist. We do this by testing whether a self-exciting TAR 
model provides a better fit for 𝑞𝑡  than a linear autoregressive specification with p lags - 
which is the null model. Since tests for arbitrage are commonly specified using the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) specification, we express the AR(p) and TAR models as: 
 𝛥𝑞𝑡 = 𝛽𝑞𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖∆𝑞𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑖=1
  (2.11) 





𝑘 = [𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑞𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖




                +[𝛽𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑞𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖






where p is the lag length, 𝑘 refers to the two regimes – inner or outer, d is the delay 
parameter used in specifying the indicator function where 1 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑑, and c is an imputed 
measure of trade costs. The speed of mean reversion in the AR(p) model is (𝛽 + 1) = 𝜌 
where 𝜌 is the sum of the autocorrelation coefficients in the AR(p) model and captures the 
dynamics in the lag structure; in the TAR model 𝜌𝑖𝑛 = (𝛽𝑖𝑛 + 1) is a measure of the speed 
of reversion in the inner regime and 𝜌𝑜𝑢𝑡 = (𝛽𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 1)  is a measure of the speed of mean 
reversion in the outer regime28. 
The estimation strategy for detecting a threshold has two parts. The first part 
involves pre-determining the lag length for the AR(p) and TAR models and then estimating 
the TAR model for for each combination of [d, c] in (2.12). The TAR model based on the 
[d, c] yielding the minimum sum of squared residuals is then used to construct a sup-Wald 
test statistic against the null AR(p) model29. Since c is not identified under the null model, 
the distribution for the Wald test is non-standard30. Thus, in the second part, a distribution 
of Wald statistics must be generated by bootstrapping. The distribution of Wald statistics 
                                                 
28 In this paper, we assume 𝑞𝑡 is a covariance stationary variable as our main objective is 
to determine whether trade costs c decline after the introduction of an FTA. We offer 
reasons for our assumption and a discussion of the effect of an FTA on the speed of mean 
reversion in Section 2.4.3 However, for the interested reader, we will report standard t-tests 
for 𝜌 = 1. 
29 It may be useful to think of (2.11) as the restricted version of (2.12) 
30 Hansen (1996) notes that since d is discrete and super-consistent, it can be treated as 
identified under the null 




is then used to determine the p-value associated with the sup-Wald test. We outline these 
steps below: 
1. Pre-determine the lag-length p for the linear AR(p) and the non-linear TAR 
model using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz’s Bayesian 
Information Criterion (SBIC), and set the same for both models31. 
2.  Estimate the TAR model over each combination of [d, c]. We search over 
d=1,2,..,p. The grid search over c requires that we set a minimum and a 
maximum value, and an increment for the grid search. We set  𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛 at the 
15𝑡ℎpercentile of  and 𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛 at the 85𝑡ℎ percentile of 𝑞𝑡. The increment is set at 
0.005. In all, the grid search runs d∙c regressions of (2.12). 
3.  Choose the combination of d and c that minimize the sum of squared residuals 











] where T is the sample size and ?̃?2 is the sum of squared residuals 
from (2.11). 
Because 𝑊𝑇 does not follow a standard chi-square distribution, Hansen(1997; 1999; 2017) 
recommends bootstrapping to generate a distribution of Wald statistics as below: 
                                                 
31 We choose the smaller of the lag-length p from the AIC and SBIC. Sarno et al. (2004) 
show, using Monte Carlo simulation, that tests for a threshold effect perform well against 
the null of linearity if the threshold autoregressive process is characterized by a small 
autoregressive order, regardless of the size of c. 




1. Generate n i.i.d. draws 𝑢𝑡 from the N(0,1) distribution. 
2. Set 𝑦𝑡
∗ =  𝑢𝑡𝜖?̂?where 𝜖?̂? are the OLS residuals from the null model in (2.11). 
3. Using the observations (𝑦𝑡
∗, 𝑞𝑡−1, ∑ ∆𝑞𝑡−𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1 ), estimate (2.11) and (2.12). Then, 
    using the sum of squared residuals from each model - ?̃?∗2 and ?̂?∗2- construct the  
     bootstrapped Wald-statistic as:  
 𝑊𝑇
𝑏 = 𝑇[
?̃?∗2 − ?̂?∗2(?̂?, ?̂?)
?̂?∗2(?̂?, ?̂?)
]  (2.13) 
 
4. Repeat 1 - 3 10,000 times in order to obtain a sample 𝑊𝑇
𝑏(1),..., 𝑊𝑇
𝑏(10,000) of  
bootstrapped Wald-statistics, arranged in descending order. 
5. Calculate the asymptotic p-value for sup-𝑊𝑇 by counting the number of  
bootstrap samples for which 𝑊𝑇
𝑏 exceeds the observed sup-𝑊𝑇 . 
Table 2.4 presents the results of this two-part estimation where our focus is on whether a 
threshold c exists. The values of c along with the delay parameter d and the lag length p 
corresponding to the sup-𝑊𝑇 statistic are reported
32.We see that for five of South Korea's 
FTA partners that we study - Chile, the United States, Turkey, Norway, and Germany - the 
Wald statistics are significant at the 2 percent marginal significance level or better and 
indicate that the self-exciting TAR model with reported threshold c provides a better fit for 
𝑞𝑡  than the AR(p) model. Since c represents the percentage difference between the mean 
                                                 
32 Since our main interest is in whether a threshold exists, we present the estimates of 𝜌𝑖𝑛 
and  𝜌𝑜𝑢𝑡 but do not discuss them in this Section. 




price differential with trade costs and the mean price differential with no trade costs, we 
may say that South Korea's trade costs with Chile, the United States, Turkey, Norway, and 
Germany are respectively 5 percent, 16 percent, 14.5 percent, 14 percent, and 5 percent. 
For the remaining four countries, there is no evidence of a threshold effect. There 
are two possible interpretations according to Imbs et al. (2003): (i) c is so small (or zero) 
that all |𝑞𝑡 | effectively reside in the outer regime; or (ii) c is so large that all |𝑞𝑡| reside in 
the inner regime, making the threshold effect undetected. 
2.4.3  Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregressive Model with a Broken Threshold  
We now wish to investigate whether free trade agreements between South Korea 
and its FTA partners have led to increased market integration. Two aspects of market 
integration we expect to see after the FTA include: (1) a decline in trade costs c, i.e 
𝑐𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 < 𝑐𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒; and (2) an increase in the speed of convergence of the home-foreign 
price differential 𝑞𝑡  toward the threshold in the outer regime, i.e. a 𝜌
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑜𝑢𝑡 <
𝜌𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒,𝑜𝑢𝑡. To examine these hypotheses, we incorporate one additional feature into the 
TAR model: a break in the threshold c occurring at time τ – the date the FTA is adopted. 
This is a novel feature of our work. 
The goal of the estimation strategy is to compare the fit of a TAR model, allowing 
for a break in the threshold at the FTA date, to the null model of an unbroken threshold33. 
                                                 
33 An alternative test could be constructed with the AR(p) model over the full sample as 
the null, instead of the unbroken TAR. We choose the null of a TAR model because it is 
predicated on the existence of trade costs. 




Candidate countries for this investigation are South Korea's five FTA partners for which 
the sup-Wald test in Section 2.4.2 showed a threshold exists.  
We begin by first establishing that for these five FTA partners, the null of a linear 
AR(p) model is rejected in favor of a TAR model in both the pre-FTA and post-FTA sub-
samples. This allows for the possibility that the c may differ before and after the FTA. The 
estimation strategy is the same as in Section 2.4.2 except that it is applied to the two sub-
periods. As before, the best fit TAR model for the period before the FTA and the best fit 
TAR model after the FTA are identified as the ones for which the sup-Wald statistic leads 
to rejection of the AR(p) model using a bootstrapped distribution of Wald test statistics, 
here generated for the pre- and post-FTA sub-samples. 
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 report the results for a TAR model for Chile, the United 
States, Turkey, Norway, and Germany, over the sub-sample before the FTA and for the 
sub-sample after the FTA34. As it turns out, if we are willing to accept a 10 percent 
significance level or better, Table 2.5 and Table 2.6  show that there is preliminary evidence 
that all five countries experienced a break in the threshold c after the FTA went into effect. 
For example, for Chile before the FTA, the bootstrapped p-value favors a TAR model with 
a threshold c = 0.21 over a linear AR model; after the FTA, the bootstrapped p-value also 
favors a TAR model, but with a lower threshold c = 0.05. However, we do not yet know 
whether a broken threshold model is significantly different from an unbroken threshold 
model. 
                                                 
34 Results for the full set of FTA partners is available upon request. 




In the next step, for each of the five countries, the best-fit pre-FTA and post-FTA 
TAR models are “joined” (yielding the full sample) and tested against the best fit, unbroken 
threshold TAR model from Section 2.4.2. These “best-fit” specifications are based on the 
regressions yielding the minimum sum of squared errors over a joint grid search on [d,c]. 
In this case, since our null model is an unbroken threshold where c is identified, there is no 
nuisance parameter and we do not need to bootstrap a distribution for our Wald test. If the 
“joined” TAR with a break in the threshold c after passage of the FTA has a significantly 
better fit than the TAR model without a threshold break based on the Wald test, we may 
conclude that a threshold break occurs at the FTA date. The results are presented in Table 
2.7. 
Table 2.7 indicates that the self-exciting TAR with a threshold-break at the FTA 
date is a better fit than an unbroken threshold model for Chile, the United States, Turkey, 
Norway and Germany. Looking at Table Table 2.5 and Table 2.6, we see that for each of 
these countries, c has declined; there is evidence that free trade agreements have led to a 
reduction in the costs associated with international trade. For the FTAs by country, c 
declined from 0.21 to 0.05 for Chile, from 0.16 to 0.02 for the United States and from 0.16 
to 0.025 for Turkey. For South Korea's free trade agreement with the EFTA and with EU, 
we see that c has a more modest decline from 0.085 to 0.08, and from 0.045 to 0.04, 
respectively. The declines in trade costs suggest that free trade agreements between South 
Korea and these five FTA partners has enhanced market integration. 
Finally, we report the point estimates (𝜌𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒,𝑜𝑢𝑡) and (𝜌𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑜𝑢𝑡) for the periods 
delineated by the FTA. We view evidence of a threshold break as loosely indicative of a 
change in the speed of adjustment since threshold breaks are identified by changes in 𝛽 




(and by extension 𝜌). We therefore expect to see a rise in the speed of mean reversion after 
the FTA, 𝜌𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑜𝑢𝑡 < 𝜌𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒,𝑜𝑢𝑡. Results from Table Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 for Chile, 
the United States, Turkey, Norway and Germany are mixed. Based on the point estimates 
only, it appears that for the United States, the speed of adjustment increased after the FTA. 
However, for Chile, Turkey, Norway and Germany, the speed of adjustment appears to 
have declined after the FTA.  
We do not enter the debate about whether these point estimates differ from 1.0. 
Despite the fact that estimates of 𝛽 are super-consistent under a unit root null, we are 
agnostic about whether 𝑞𝑡  contains a unit root. It is well-known that there are power 
problems rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root35.These power problems mean that 
tests for a unit root are sensitive to sample size, and are related to sample period length, 
both of which are concerns with our data. Since our data is monthly beginning in 1998 and 
ending in April 2017, and South Korea's free trade agreements were not adopted until 2004 
or later, we are limited in the sample size post-FTA. We have pre-FTA sample size 
constraints as well because we chose the period commencing with a floating exchange rate 
in South Korea in 1998. Moreover, the outer regime sample size is further limited by the 
size of the inner regime. For these reasons, tests for evidence of market integration that rely 
on estimates of the pace of mean reversion may not be informative. 
2.5  Conclusion 
South Korea with its significant dependency on trade, has initiated FTAs with many 
countries since 2004 when it adopted its first FTA with Chile. We investigate whether 
                                                 
35 Caner et al. (2001) develop tests for a unit root in a two-regime TAR model. 




South Korea's free trade agreements have promoted market integration. We study nine of 
South Korea's free trade agreements. Because free trade agreements eliminate or reduce 
tariffs on international trade, trade costs should decline. In terms of arbitrage theory, the 
band of inaction owing to trade costs should shrink after the passage of an FTA.  
Our paper makes two contributions. First, we add to the literature on market 
integration by adapting a “band” TAR model to include a break at the FTA date. For five 
of nine of South Korea's free trade partners that we study - Chile, the United States and 
Turkey which have bilateral FTAs with South Korea, and Norway and Germany - which 
are part of FTA with trade blocs, we report evidence of a break in the threshold of a TAR 
model at the FTA date. We find that the threshold declines after the FTA and conclude that 
trade costs have declined. We interpret this as evidence that market integration has 
advanced for these five countries.  
Another effect of free trade agreements is that the pace of convergence in the home-
foreign price differential should increase after the FTA as the band of inaction narrows. 
Here, we find little evidence to support that market integration has been achieved. We 
interpret this latter finding more cautiously in terms of its implications about market 
integration since we considered point estimates of the speed of mean reversion only.  
Second, we believe that we have contributed to the literature on market integration 
by adapting a modelling and test strategy that can be used to study market integration. Our 
strategy uncovers what happens to the costs of trade after an event, like free trade 
agreements that is expected to foster greater competition, occurs. In addition, our paper 




offers a strategy that may have application for researchers using threshold autoregressive 




















     Table 2.1 Effective Dates of South Korea’s Free Trade Agreements  
 


























































       
 




    Table 2.2 Tariff Elimination Schedules: FTAs by country 
 
FTA  Countries  % of Imports that Tariffs Eliminated (year 0)  
KOR-Chile  
South Korea  87.2%  
Chile  41.8%  
KOR-Singapore  
South Korea  59.7%  
Singapore  100%  
KOR-U.S.  
South Korea  80.0%  
U.S.  82.1%  
KOR-Australia  
South Korea  75.2%  
Australia  90.9%  
KOR-China  
South Korea  49.9%  
China  20.1%  





South Korea  91.3%  
Vietnam  86.3%  
KOR-India  
South Korea  
8 years for zero tariffs  
India  
KOR-Peru  
South Korea  85.54%  
Peru  67.86%  
KOR-Turkey  
South Korea  80.0%  
Turkey  65.0%  
KOR-Canada  
South Korea  81.9%  
Canada  76.4%  
KOR-New Zealand  
South Korea  48.3%  
New Zealand  92.0%  





South Korea  82.38%  
Colombia  60.64%  
 
 
     Table 2.3 Tariff Elimination Schedules: FTAs by trade blocs 
 
FTA Countries % of Imports that Tariffs Eliminated (year 0) 
KOR-EFTA 
South Korea 86.3% 
EFTA 100%( excluding agricultural products) 
KOR-
ASEAN 
South Korea 70% 
ASEAN 
Decrease in Tariffs on 50% of total imports 
by 0-5% 
KOR-EU 









       Table 2.4 Full-Sample Estimates of Self-Exciting TAR Model  
 
FTAs by country 







d  ρin  ρout  
Bootstrapped p-
value  
Chile  0.05  
3  





1  0.01  
Peru  0.055  
2  
228  0.86 0.96**  0.21  
2.94  
2  0.41  
India  0.09  
3  
228  1.03  0.98**  0.17  
5.37  
1  0.31  
Singapore  0.04  
3  
228  1.22 0.98**  0.24  
13.91  
1  0.23  
U.S. 0.16  
4  
228  0.98 0.97*  0.31  
32.66***  
1  0.00  




Turkey  0.145  
3  
229  1.06  0.96***  0.27  
25.68***  
3  0.01  
FTAs by trade blocs 







d  ρin  ρout  
Bootstrapped p-
value  
Indonesia  0.21  
4  
228  1.01  0.95**  0.25  
16.49  
1  0.65  
Norway  0.14  
3  
229  0.99  0.96**  0.15  
13.74**  
3  0.02  
Germany  0.05  
2  
218  1.25***  0.96**  0.11  
9.27**  
2  0.02  









    Table 2.5  Sub-Sample Estimates of Two Regime SETAR(p,d)  
                     for FTAs by country 
 
Before FTA  







d  ρin  ρout  
bootstrapped 
p-value  
Chile  0.21  
3  
69  0.99  0.91***  0.40  
10.29*  
1  0.06  
U.S.  0.16  
4  
166  0.98  0.97*  0.33  
28.01***  
1  0.00  
Turkey  0.16  
3  
181  1.05  0.97*  0.30  
25.46***  
3  0.01  
After FTA  







d  ρin  ρout  
bootstrapped 
p-value  
Chile  0.05  
2  
160  1.67***  0.97*  0.12  
12.86**  
1  0.02  




U.S. 0.02  
3  
62  0.87  0.96  0.35  
12.64**  
2  0.02  
Turkey  0.025  
2  
48  -0.10**  0.98  0.24  
8.49*  
1  0.06  

























    Table 2.6  Sub-Sample Estimates of Two Regime SETAR(p,d)  
                     for FTAs by trade blocs 
 
Before FTA  







d  ρin  ρout  
bootstrapped 
p-value  
Norway  0.085  
3  
101  0.99  0.92**  0.26  
8.23*  
2  0.09  
Germany  0.045  
2  
148  1.43***  0.95**  0.18  
13.72***  
1 0.01 
After FTA  







d  ρin  ρout  
bootstrapped 
p-value  
Norway  0.08  
1  
128 1.17*  0.99  0.04  
5.83**  
1  0.03  
Germany  0.04 
1  
70 0.76 0.99  0.02  
1.48*  
1  0.09 
     Significance levels are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10. †H0: ρ = 1. 
 
 




       Table 2.7  Wald Test Results for Threshold Break at FTA  
FTAs with a country 
Country  Wald statistics  
Chile  12.98***  
U.S.  8.45**  
Turkey  8.18***  
FTAs with regional trade blocs 
Country  Wald statistics  
Norway  4.36**  
Germany  7.85***  
















     Figure  2.2  Arbitrage Model with a Break in Trade Costs 
 
 








Inflation targeting is a practice that central banks around the world began to adopt 
as early as 1990. New Zealand was the first adopter. Since then, 37 more countries – 
developed and developing countries alike – have adopted inflation targeting as their 
monetary framework. Inflation targeting policy was expected to lead to success on three 
counts: (1) a decline in the level of inflation, (2) a reduction in the volatility of inflation, 
and (3) a decline in inflation persistence, as a central bank publicly announced its 
commitment to a target range for inflation. Under this regime, inflation expectations would 
anchor around the target, further raising the probability that targeting would be successful. 
However, studies are divided over whether the three outcomes have been realized.  
At about the same time that inflation targeting began to gain traction in the 1990s, 
a worldwide era of disinflation commenced. World average inflation over the period 1970-
89 was approximately 15% and median inflation approximately 10%. In the subsequent 
two decades, world inflation averaged approximately 12% and median inflation was 
approximately 6%.  
                                                 
36 Lim, E.S. and J.B. Bass. To be submitted to International Journal of Central Banking. 




Despite wide variation in country experience with inflation, there has been a general 
decline in inflation over these two periods, with higher income countries experiencing 
declines in inflation earlier than others. Explanations for the declines in inflation rates 
included globalization which fostered competition and efficiency gains, advances in 
technology which generated productivity gains, oil price declines, and counter-inflationary 
monetary policy adoption borne out of an era of relatively high inflation 37 . These 
explanations leave room to doubt whether any record of inflation success by inflation 
targeting adopters can be attributed to their new monetary framework.  
Studies of inflation targeting find heterogeneity in the inflation experience for 
targeters and non-targeters. Some targeters see no significant impact of targeting on 
inflation success metrics, while many non-targeters have experiences similar to successful 
targeters. The studies vary in the countries and time period studied and the techniques used. 
Some studies focus on countries in Europe or Asia; others focus on countries by income 
status. Alternative techniques based on a linear autoregressive model have been used: 
propensity score matching, median unbiased estimation, and panel estimation. 
Autorgressive models with structural breaks and smooth transition non-linear models have 
also been estimated. A consistent picture of the benefits of inflation targeting has not yet 
emerged. However, there are no studies of inflation targeting to our knowledge that 
examine inflation persistence by using a model that allows for threshold non-linearity at 
the targeted inflation range.  
                                                 
37 Rogoff (2003) discusses factors underlying the global disinflation that began in the 
1990s. 




In this paper, we use a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model to study the period of 
inflation targeting. This model is particularly apt for inflation targeters yet, to our 
knowledge, has not been deployed38. Inflation targeters state a range within which the 
inflation target resides. When inflation is outside the range, more aggressive monetary 
policy is pursued than when inside the range; at the same time, the impact of anchored 
expectations is operative. We focus primarily on inflation persistence – an issue raised in 
Benati (2008) in the debate over the effect of changes in monetary regimes. Using a select 
sample of inflation targeters, we compare estimates of inflation persistence from a TAR 
model over the inflation targeting sample to estimates of persistence from a linear 
autoregressive model for the period prior to the adoption of inflation targeting. We further 
examine differences in inflation persistence across level of development and for countries 
that have ever experienced hyperinflation. To address issues raised that events unrelated to 
inflation targeting policy could explain our findings, we include a select set of seven non-
IT targeters in our study and conduct a counterfactual exercise. Our study relies on monthly 
data from 1974-2017, making our study one of a few on inflation targeting that includes 
data well-past the end of the worldwide recession.  
We find that in countries where central banks have adopted inflation targeting, 
measures of inflation performance improve. Countries achieve lower rates of inflation, 
have less volatile inflation rates, and experience a drop in inflation persistence. We conduct 
counterfactual exercises to address the possibility that these declines would have occurred 
absent inflation targeting by examining the inflation performance in seven countries that 
                                                 
38  Gregoriou et al. (2006) estimate a logistic and exponential smoothed transition 
autoregressive model for deviations of the inflation rate from the point target. The inflation 
target ranges are not considered. 




are not inflation targeters but are similar in terms of income per capita and data availability. 
We impose a breakdate of 1990 in our counterfactual exercise which is commonly quoted 
as the demarcation line between the two eras of inflation performance around the world, 
irrespective of monetary regime.  
We find the break is significant and that inflation performance for our set of non-
targeters also improves. However, a comparison of the inflation performance between 
inflation targeters and non-targeters (using an imposed breakdate of 1990), reveals that 
there are stronger improvements among the inflation targeting countries. In a second 
counterfactual, we consider whether 1990 is the optimal breakdate for studying the 
inflation performance of our non-targeting countries before and after 1990. Using an 
endogenous break search methodology, we find dispersion in breakdates with only one 
country having an optimal break date within three years of 1990. We interpret the variation 
in breakdates among non-targeters to be inconsistent with the story that inflation rates 
around the world were in decline beginning with the decade of 1990. We conclude that the 
practice of inflation targeting which commenced in 1990 and has been adopted by many 
countries around the world in the two decades since then, has brought gains in inflation 
performance. Our study contributes to the divide over whether central banks that have 
adopted inflation targeting can expect to see positive changes in inflation dynamics. We 
also contribute by offering a different model for estimating inflation when inflation-
targeting is operative, and for using counterfactuals to investigate the robustness of our 
conclusions. 
In Section 3.2, we discuss inflation targeting and relevant literature. In Section 3.3, 
we introduce the data and the set of countries we study. We provide a descriptive   of 




inflation rates among inflation targeters and our group of non-inflation targeters. In Section 
3.4, we estimate two models of inflation depending on whether a country targets an 
inflation rate or not. We report measures of persistence before and after the adoption of 
inflation targeting for our targeters, and from a counterfactual exercise for non-targeters 
where a breakdate of 1990 is imposed. We then investigate the optimality of the 
counterfactual breakdate. We conclude in Section 3.5. 
3.2  Inflation Targeting and Relevant Literature 
In the 1960s, Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) argued that there is no long-run 
trade-off between inflation and output. The acceptance of this view prompted some central 
banks around the world to publicly commit to a medium-term goal of price stability as a 
pathway to lower inflation, which is called Inflation Targeting. Under this framework, the 
central bank commits to keeping the inflation rate within a band around an inflation rate 
objective39. Central banks are expected to hit the targeted inflation rate on average over the 
medium term40. Further, the targeted inflation rate is determined based on current and 
projected future economic conditions. This framework gives central banks the discretion 
to react to shocks and allow for deviations from the goal in the short run.  
                                                 
39 According to The Centre for Central Banking Studies Handbook No.29 "State of the Art 
of Inflation Targeting-2012" published by the Bank of England, most industrialized 
countries have inflation targets of 1%-3%. Some non-industrialized countries also have 
inflation targets in this range: 2% in Peru; 2% in the Czech Republic, and 2.5% in Poland. 
One country has a target above 5%: Ghana's target rate is 8.7%. 
40 Generally, developed-country-IT targeters set a mid-point target rate of inflation of 2% 
with a band of ±1%. The target rates and ranges of developing-country-IT targeters are 
more heterogeneous. See Hammond et al. (2012) and Roger (2010) for more detail. 




Two features that distinguish inflation targeting frameworks from other monetary 
policy frameworks are high transparency and accountability. Central banks that have 
adopted inflation targeting policy frequently communicate with the government and with 
the public. Central banks publish The Inflation Report which contains information on the 
stated goals of a central bank along with limitations of their policy. The Inflation Report 
presents numerical values of inflation targets, why central banks chose the targeted 
inflation rate, how the inflation target can be achieved under current economic conditions, 
and reasons why the actual inflation rate deviates from the target. (See Bernanke (1999)). 
Such transparency is expected to make it easier for the central bank to move the inflation 
rate toward its goal faster, and to keep it within the targeted range once the goal is achieved. 
Because IT policy increases transparency, it is also expected to increase the accountability 
of a central bank41. Inflation targeting is thus expected to reduce the level and volatility of 
inflation. For this reason, some countries with already low rates of inflation like Thailand 
and Sweden, adopted IT policy.  
Inflation targeting may also reduce the persistence of inflation. Mishkin (2007) argues 
that inflation expectations are a key driver of inflation dynamics and that the pursuit of 
more aggressive monetary policy to control inflation may help anchor the public's 
expectation of inflation. Yigit (2010) argues that when inflation expectations are more 
heterogeneous, inflation exhibits longer memory 42 . Because inflation targeters are 
                                                 
41 See Hammond et al. (2012) for more detail on accountability and transparency. Bernanke 
et al. (1997) note that New Zealand has the strongest accountability of any central bank 
because the government has the right to dismiss the Reserve Bank's governor if the inflation 
target is not achieved. 
42 Levin et al. (2004), Siklos (1998) and Yigit (2010) find that inflation expectations among 
the public have decreased after IT policy. 




operationally independent from the government, monetary policy actions are more 
credible43 . Thus, operational independence may help make inflation expectations less 
diffuse, too. If inflation targeting helps to anchor the public’s inflation expectation around 
the point target, the public may be less likely to react to temporary shocks to inflation, 
leading to lower inflation persistence under an inflation targeting regime44. 
The effect of IT policy on inflation performance, however, is not settled. Corbo et al. 
(2001), Levin et al. (2004), Neumann et al. (2002) and Pétursson et al. (2004) find that IT 
policy reduces the level and volatility of inflation for developed countries. However, Ball 
et al. (2004), Brito et al. (2010) and Lin et al. (2007) find little to no effect among developed 
countries. Several studies (e.g. Canarella et al. 2017; Lin et al. 2007; Lin et al. 2009) find 
differential effects of IT policy on inflation performance among developed countries and 
developing countries, while Lin et al. (2009) report favorable evidence among developing 
countries. Mixed evidence is also reported on inflation persistence. Levin et al. (2004) find 
inflation to be less persistent after IT policy among the earliest sixteen IT targeters, but not 
among non-IT targeters. Ball et al. (2004) find smaller inflation persistence over time for 
both IT targeters and non-IT targeters, supporting their argument that less persistent 
inflation among IT targeters may not result from IT policy. Gerlach et al. (2012) presents 
evidence of a decline in inflation persistence over time for both IT targeters and non-IT 
targeters, but that the positive effects of IT policy are driven by Asia-Pacific countries. The 
                                                 
43 According to Hammond et al. (2012), “operational independence” is distinct from “goal 
independence”, and legitimizes central bank independence. Goal independence is when a 
central bank sets the inflation goal without consultation with the government. Not all 
inflation targeters have goal independence. 
44 Bratsiotis et al. (2015) introduce a theoretical model to explain how IT policy reduces 
inflation persistence. 




effects of IT policy on inflation persistence among developed IT targeters are 
comparatively clear: Baxa et al. (2014), Bratsiotis et al. (2015), Canarella et al. (2017) and 
Siklos (1998) find that after IT policy, inflation is less persistent among developed IT 
targeters – New Zealand, Canada, U.K. Sweden, Australia and Finland.  
In contrast, the results are less clear among developing-country-IT targeters. Siklos 
(2008) finds a decline in inflation persistence for Chile, Mexico, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, out of thirteen developing-country-IT targeters. Capistrán et al. (2009) report 
that IT policy has positive effects on a decline in inflation persistence for a few less 
developed IT targeters – Brazil and Mexico – but more persistent inflation for Chile and 
Peru in Latin America. Filardo et al. (2010) find more persistent inflation for Thailand, the 
Philippines and Indonesia after IT policy. However, Canarella et al. (2017) find no decline 
in inflation persistence after IT policy among less developed IT targeters. 
3.3  Data and Descriptive Analyses 
As of January 2018, there are thirty-eight IT targeters with start dates ranging from 
1990 - 201445. In order to achieve a reasonable sample size on either side of the IT-adoption 
date, we select a set of countries that adopted inflation targeting on or before 2005. Further, 
to increase comparability across developed and developing countries, we consider only 
floating exchange rate countries to avoid interference that a fixed exchange rate objective 
                                                 
45  The inflation targeters include: Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Albania, 
Armenia, Brazil, Colombia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Moldova, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Norway, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom 




may play in a central bank's desire to achieve its inflation rate objective. Our country set 
thus includes five developed IT targeters: Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, South 
Korea, and Norway; and seven less developed IT targeters: Chile, South Africa, Thailand, 
the Philippines, Indonesia, Poland and Brazil;  
We construct inflation rates from monthly data on the consumer price index (CPI) 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD)’s Statistics. The sample period covers January 1974 
- October 2017. Because inflation rate goals are expressed on an annualized basis, we 
transform monthly CPI data into annualized inflation rates using the natural log first 
difference in the CPI. 
Table 3.1 lists the IT policy effective year and each IT targeter’s inflation rate target 
level. While most IT targeters set an inflation target within a range, the U.K. and Sweden 
set a point target level without a range, explicitly. In practice, both countries allow inflation 
rate to move around a target level (2%) with ±1% ranges. IT targeters such as South Africa 
and Thailand announce target ranges of 3% − 6%, and 0.5%− 3%, respectively, without 
stating a point target. 
Figure 3.1 shows the experience with inflation before and after the adoption of 
inflation targeting for our five developed countries. In general, the figures provide 
anecdotal support for the idea that inflation targeting has reduced the average level of 
inflation. For most developed IT targeters, inflation rates have declined and reached the 
target band set by the central banks. Figure 3.2 show and Figure 3.3 the experience with 
inflation before and after IT policy is implemented for five developing countries that have 




no record of hyperinflation and for two developing countries that have had hyperinflation. 
These figures also lend support to the idea that inflation targeting has brought inflation 
rates down with little movement outside the target range. 
To address issues raised about events unrelated to the adoption of inflation targeting 
but that could explain our findings, we include seven non-IT targeters in our study. The 
choice of countries for the counterfactual exercises is not easy. Conclusions about the 
“treatment effect” (i.e. inflation targeting) necessarily depend on the characteristics of the 
untreated group. In cross-country time series studies like ours, the 'treatment' can occur at 
different points in time and across different countries, making it difficult to attribute any 
results to the 'treatment' alone. Moreover, we must consider the availability of data prior to 
counterfactual break dates that we test. With these issues in mind, we choose countries that 
are similar in terms of income per capita and inflation experience to the set of inflation 
targeters we study, and that have a sufficient number of observations on either side of the 
breakdate. The developed countries used in our counterfactual analysis are: United States, 
Switzerland, and Denmark; and the developing countries are: Malaysia, Kenya, Bolivia, 
and Ecuador. Of the developing countries, Bolivia and Ecuador have experienced 
hyperinflation. Figures 3.4 – Figure 3.6 show the inflation experience of the non-targeters. 
A counterfactual break date is set at 1990, the date associated with worldwide disinflation. 
3.3.1  The Effects of IT policy on the Average of Inflation rates 
Table 3.2 reports the average inflation rates for developed countries and less 
developed countries among IT targeters, both pre-and post- IT policy. The column labeled 
p-value gives the significance level for a test of the difference in the mean inflation rates 




over the two periods. We find that all twelve inflation targeters show a statistically 
significant decline in the average inflation rates after IT policy begins. 
We also investigate whether the seven non-IT-targeters experience a decline in the 
average inflation rates, even though they have not adopted IT policy. To do this, we impose 
our counterfactual date of 1990. We report average inflation rates over pre- and post- 1990 
in Table 3.3. Here, we see that average inflation rates have declined significantly in all non-
IT targeters, except for Kenya. 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show that in nearly all cases, the average level of inflation 
has declined regardless of whether countries are IT targeters or non-IT targeters. There 
may be other explanations for the decline in the inflation rates that we observe for IT 
targeters. However, we can see that the decline in average inflation rates among IT targeters 
is larger than among non-IT targeters. The difference in the decline in inflation rates across 
IT-targeters and non-IT targeters may indicate that IT policy has positive effects. 
3.3.2  The Effects of IT policy on Inflation Volatility 
Next, we explore whether inflation rate volatility declined after the adoption date 
of IT policy for IT-targeters and non-IT-targeters. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 report the results. 
We see the volatility of the inflation rates for nine out of the twelve IT targeters have had 
a statistically significant decline, and four out of seven non-IT targeters experienced a 
statistically significant decline in inflation volatility. In some cases, whether for IT-
targeters or not, the reductions in volatility are sizable. Like our results for inflation, these 
results raise the possibility that there are alternative explanations for the decline in inflation 
rate volatility that we find among the IT-targeters. 




3.4  Estimation, Results, and Counterfactuals 
We now turn our attention to measures of inflation persistence. Inflation persistence 
is a measure of the sum of the impact of a white noise shock to inflation k periods ago on 
current inflation. It is also referred to as the “memory” of a series. Estimates of inflation 
persistence derive from running a linear autoregression of the form: 
 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌1𝜋𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝜌𝑘𝜋𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜈𝑡  (3.1) 
where 𝜋𝑡 is a measure of inflation and  ∑ 𝜌𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1  is a measure of inflation persistence. 
Higher measures of persistence imply that the inflation rate will spend a longer time away 
from its mean. Persistence is also, therefore, a measure of the speed of reversion to the 
mean. Greater persistence implies a slower speed of mean reversion; lower persistence 
implies a faster speed of mean reversion.  
The inflation rates of countries with central banks that adopt a monetary framework 
of inflation targeting are hypothesized to exhibit lower persistence and faster speeds of 
mean reversion after inflation targeting has commenced. A corollary is that inflation 
targeters will have a better record of inflation performance than non-adopters after inflation 
targeting. To test these hypotheses, we estimate two models: a linear autoregressive (AR) 
model for periods and countries where inflation targeting is not practiced, and a Threshold 
Autoregressive (TAR) when inflation targeting is practiced. We also conduct 
counterfactual exercises to check the robustness of our results. 
 
 




3.4.1  Inflation Persistence among Inflation Targeters: Before and After IT 
Policy 
We begin by estimating measures of persistence in the period before IT policy when 
no target is in force. We model inflation for the pre-IT policy period using a linear 
autoregressive linear AR (k) specification, re-parameterized as: 
 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼 + γ𝜋𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖∆𝜋𝑡−𝑖
𝑘−1
𝑖=1
+ 𝜖𝑡  (3.2) 
where 𝜋𝑡 is measured as the log first difference in the CPI, on an annualized basis 
and is stationary46. 𝛼 is a constant, 𝜋𝑡−1 is the lagged inflation rate, and 𝜖𝑡 is white noise.  
In this re-parameterization of the AR(k) model in (3.1),  γ = ∑ 𝜌𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1   is the sum of 
the k lags impact on inflation at time t. The coefficient estimate 𝛾 captures the degree of 
persistence in the inflation rate and is therefore also an estimate of the pace of reversion 
toward the mean inflation rate, α. Lower values of  γ imply lower measures of persistence 
and faster speeds of mean reversion. 
For the period after the adoption of IT policy, we model inflation using a Threshold 
Autoregressive Model. With inflation targeting, the thresholds in the TAR model are 
explicit47.  
                                                 
46 ADF unit root test results show that 𝜋𝑡 is stationary across all countries for pre-and post 
IT policy. 
47  TAR models also allow for unknown thresholds, in which case the thresholds are 
identified by a grid search. See Hansen (2017). 




They are the upper and lower limits of the targeted inflation range set by the central bank. 
We define these thresholds as [𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛]. 
We assume that inflation persistence is symmetric above the maximum inflation 
target rate  𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥 and below the minimum inflation target rate 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛48. Thus, when 𝜋𝑡 is 
above 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥  or below 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛 , the inflation rate is in the ‘outer regime’. By assuming 
symmetry in the behavior of 𝜋𝑡 above 𝜋
𝑚𝑎𝑥 and below 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛, the two outer regimes can be 
treated as a single “outer regime.” 
In a TAR model, assignment of 𝜋𝑡 to the outer (and inner) regime is based on an 
indicator function that determines the regime. 𝑗 refers to the two regimes-inner or outer. 
The indicator function bases regime assignment on a d-period lag of 𝜋𝑡 (which is discussed 
below) relative to the thresholds. In the outer regime, if the indicator function satisfies 
𝐼 (𝜋𝑡−𝑑  >  𝜋
𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑜𝑟 𝜋𝑡−𝑑 < 𝜋
𝑚𝑖𝑛)  =  𝐼(∙) = 1, then 𝜋𝑡  is assigned to the outer regime. 
When the condition is not satisfied,  𝐼(∙)  =  0 and 𝜋𝑡 is assigned to the inner regime. Our 
TAR(k) model is specified as follows: 
𝜋𝑡
𝑗












The non-linearity of the TAR model arises because the persistence of inflation 
depends on whether the inflation rate is outside or inside the target band, giving rise to two 
                                                 
48 See Sarno et al. (2004) who investigated persistence in the real exchange rate using a 
TAR model. 




estimates 𝛽𝑖𝑛  and 𝛽𝑜𝑢𝑡. 49 The coefficient estimate 𝛽𝑜𝑢𝑡 gives a measure of persistence 
when inflation resides outside the inflation target range.  
We expect that inflation targeting will reduce persistence in the inflation rate after 
the adoption of IT policy when the inflation rate is outside the targeted range. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that estimates of 𝛽𝑜𝑢𝑡 from (3.3) will be less than estimates of 𝛾 from (3.2). 
Figure 3.7 gives a stylized picture of how IT policy is expected to affect the level, volatility, 
and persistence in the inflation rate. 
TAR estimation proceeds in several steps. First, the lag length k in (3.3) must be 
determined prior to estimating the model. Then, the “delay parameter” d and the threshold 
values, both required for the indicator function, must be established. Because the delay 
parameter is unknown, a grid search over d is done50.  For each d, the identified TAR model 
is tested against the null of a linear AR(k) model estimated over the same sample period51. 
A selection criteria for the best fit TAR model is based on a sup-Wald test statistic. We 
outline the steps below for TAR estimation: 
1. Pre-determine the lag-length k for the TAR model using the Akaike Information  
                                                 
49 We expect that when inflation resides inside the targeted range, the speed of mean 
reversion will be faster, 𝛽𝑖𝑛< 𝛽𝑜𝑢𝑡, or white noise. However, the difference between these 
two estimates is not our main focus. 
50 The grid search over d is constrained by 1 ≤ d ≤ k. 
51  In TAR model, Hansen (1997; 1999) argues that since a value of threshold is not 
identified under the null model, the distribution for the Wald test is non-standard. 
Therefore, he suggests bootstrapping. However, we do not bootstrap for the following two 
reasons: the value of threshold for this study is already identified since central banks of 
each IT targeter explicitly announce their targeted inflation level; and Hansen (1996) notes 
that since d is discrete and super-consistent, it can be treated as identified under the null 
even though it is not actually identified. 




Criterion (AIC), and set it the same for the linear AR model. Estimate the model 
over the post-IT policy sample period. 
2. Estimate the null AR model in (3.2) using k from Step 1 over the post-IT policy 
sample period. Save the sum of squared residuals ?̃?2  
3. Estimate the TAR model in (3.3) over each d. We search over d=1,2,..,k.  
4. Choose the d that minimizes the sum of squared residuals ?̂?2(𝑑) from (3.3) as  











where T is the sample size and ?̃?2 is the sum of squared residuals from  (3.2). 
6. Based on sup-𝑊𝑇, test whether the TAR model for the post-IT policy sample 
period yields a better fit than the null AR model over the IT-policy sample 
period. 
Table 3.6 reports inflation persistence estimates from (3.2) before the adoption of 
IT policy and from (3.3) after the adoption of IT policy for developed countries. Also 
reported is the sup-𝑊𝑇, statistic for model fit in the post-IT sample period. A F-test for 
differences in inflation persistence – γ̂𝐴𝑅 = ?̂?𝑜𝑢𝑡 – is also reported. Table 3.7 reports the 
same for developing countries that target inflation.  
We see that for all inflation targeters, a TAR model for the post-IT policy sample 
period yields a better fit than an autoregressive model based on the sup-𝑊𝑇 statistic. 




Second, in all cases except South Africa and Sweden52, inflation persistence declines after 
inflation targeting. We also observe that for four of the developed countries, γ < 0. Benati 
(2008) reports a similar finding among developed countries after implementing inflation 
targeting. Our results for the inflation targeters that we study provide some confirmation 
that inflation targeting reduces inflation persistence. In the next section, we conduct 
counterfactuals to investigate the robustness of our findings. 
3.4.2  Inflation Persistence among Non-Targeters: Counterfactuals 
Our results from Section 3.4.1 provide support for the idea that inflation targeting 
policy will lead to a reduction in the persistence of shocks to inflation. This result holds for 
developed and developing countries, and even those that have had some history of 
hyperinflation. However, debate over the benefits of inflation targeting counterclaim that 
any reductions in the level, volatility, or the persistence of inflation are an artifact of 
globalization, worldwide declines in oil prices, or a general anti-inflation attitude among 
central banks. Indeed, a prevailing view attributed to Lucas (1976) that remains persistent 
itself, is that inflation is structural; monetary frameworks are impotent at influencing the 
dynamics of structurally-caused inflation.  
In this section, we undertake a few counterfactual studies to examine inflation 
persistence among the seven countries in our study that have not adopted inflation 
targeting. Because there is no “pre- and post-IT policy” period to study, we artificially 
impose a break date of 1990 – the often-cited date after which inflation rates around the 
                                                 
52 For Sweden, γ̂ =-0.37. Its absolute value, however, implies higher inflation persistence 
after inflation targeting. 




world begin to fall. The purpose of our first counterfactual exercise is to address the issue 
that, independent of inflation targeting, inflation dynamics were changing around the 
world. If non-inflation targeting countries exhibit a decline in inflation persistence after 
1990, evidence of inflation targeting's impact on inflation persistence becomes more 
questionable. 
The breakdate of 1990, however, is itself a pre-selected counterfactual. To 
overcome the pre-selection problem, we conduct a second counterfactual. Our second 
counterfactual exercise is to use the endogenous search method of Zivot et al. (1992) for 
each country. This method estimates (3.2), searching over a trimmed interior sample (70%) 
for a break in 𝛼 (mean inflation) at a date that achieves the best model fit using a minimum 
t-statistic. Critical values for the test are based on a null model that assumes no break in α 
and a unit root in inflation, i.e. |γ| =1 in (3.2)53 
If we find that the optimal breakdates vary by country and do not cluster around 
1990 (±3 years), we may infer that changes in mean inflation and/or inflation persistence 
of non-IT targeters are unrelated to a systemic decline in inflation rates. Instead, the optimal 
break dates may correspond to country-specific events.  
Results from the counterfactual exercise where the breakdate 1990 is imposed are 
reported in Table 3.8 for developed countries and Table 3.9 for developing countries. In 
the last column of each table, the optimal breakdate from the Zivot et al. (1992) search 
                                                 
53 Rejection of the null implies a structural break in mean inflation and additionally that 
inflation is a stationary series, -1< γ  <1. Critical values from Zivot et al. (1992) provide a 
stronger test because they are based on an endogenous search methodology and a unit 
root null. 




algorithm is reported. We begin by first discussing inflation persistence before and after 
the counterfactual break date at 1990. For the developed country non-targeters, we see a 
statistically significant decline (at the 10% level or better) in inflation persistence after 
1990 across all three countries. This result suggests the plausibility that a systemic decline 
in inflation rates (at least for developed countries) materialized around 1990. For the 
developing country non-targeters, we find no statistically significant decline in persistence. 
For Kenya, however, we observe that inflation persistence has increased and is 
significantly different than pre-1990. For the developing countries, using the counterfactual 
break at 1990 leaves little evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that a systemic 
decline in inflation rates occurred around that time. 
In the second counterfactual, we consider the optimal breakdates selected from the 
search algorithm of Zivot et al. (1992), reported in the last column of Table 3.8 and Table 
3.9. If we instead consider a 3-year window on either side of 1990 to allow for randomness 
in country experience in the hypothesized worldwide decline in inflation, then the only 
optimal breakdates from Tables 3.8 – Table 3.9 that coincide with the story that inflation 
dynamics noticeably changed around 1990 is the case of Switzerland. A look at the optimal 
break dates for the remaining countries shows no evidence that would be consistent with a 
breakdate at or about 1990. These findings make circumspect the alternative explanation 
that global disinflation around 1990 is responsible for findings that inflation targeting has 
impacted inflation dynamics. 
 
 




3.5  Conclusions 
Inflation targeting policy is a relatively new monetary framework that has spurred 
interest among scholars and policymakers around the world since it was first adopted in 
1990 by New Zealand. Two features of inflation targeting policy – transparency and 
accountability – are expected to deliver lower inflation, less volatility, and faster reversion 
to the targeted inflation rate. Many studies, beginning in the late 1990s, have investigated 
inflation outcomes for adopters. It is fair to say that the conclusions are mixed and the 
debate vigorous over whether the benefits have materialized, or are an artifact of worldwide 
structural disinflation. We contribute to the debate by (1) studying a select set of countries, 
(2) using the most up-to-date data available, (3) estimating a model that allows for 
thresholds based on the inflation ranges prescribed by the central bank of each country; 
and (4) conducting a variety of counterfactual exercises.  
Our study includes twelve inflation targeters. For our counterfactual exercises, we 
choose seven non-inflation targeters with incomes per capita similar to our set of inflation 
targeters. Our data extends from January 1974 - October 2017. We investigate the impact 
of inflation targeting policy on inflation persistence by estimating a non-linear threshold 
autoregressive model for the post-targeting period and a linear autoregressive model for 
the pre-targeting period and for non-targeters. Our use of a threshold autoregressive model 
with thresholds based on the inflation target ranges is a new contribution to the inflation 
targeting literature.  
Using the TAR model, we find evidence that inflation targeting policy has brought 
about declines in inflation persistence that are statistically significant when compared to 




persistence measures prior to inflation targeting. However, these results could have 
alternative explanations. Thus, we conduct counterfactual exercises with our set of non-
targets by estimating an auto regressive model with an imposed break date at 1990, the date 
identified as the beginning of worldwide disinflation. We see that measures of persistence 
have declined among four non-targets after 1990, raising questions about whether central 
banks that have adopted inflation targeting have had meaningful impacts on inflation 
behavior, irrespective of a global generalized decline in inflation. We then investigate the 
imposed break at 1990 by using a search algorithm to identify the most plausible break 
date in the inflation rates of the non-targets. We find that in all cases but one, the most 
plausible break dates occur more than three years prior to, or after 1990.  
Our findings lead us to conclude that inflation targeting policy has yielded benefits 
to inflation performance, independent of other explanations. However, in the wake of the 
worldwide recession of 2008, inflation rates have remained noticeably lower. Inflation 
targeting policy may therefore lose ground as a choice for success in mitigating the effects 











    Table 3.1 Inflation Targeting Effective Year and Target Rate  
 
Developed Country IT targeters  
Country  IT Effective Year  Target rate  
Canada  1991  2% (±1%)  
U.K.  1992  2%  
Sweden  1993  2%  
South Korea  2001  3% (±1%)  
Norway  2001  2.5% (±1%)  
Developing Country IT targeters without Hyperinflation  
Country  IT Effective Year  Target rate  
Chile  1999  3% (±1%)  
South Africa  2000  3% - 6%  
Thailand  2000  0.5% - 3%  
Philippines  2002  4% (±1%)  
Indonesia  2005  5% (±1%)  




Developing Country IT targeters with Hyperinflation  
Country  IT Effective Year  Target rate  
Poland  1998  2.5% (±1%)  
Brazil  1999  4.5% (±1%)  

















    Table 3.2 Average Inflation Rate for IT targeters: Pre- and Post- IT Policy  
 
Developed Country IT targeters  
Country  Pre - IT policy  Post - IT policy  
t-test statistics†   
(p-value)  
Canada  6.94  1.84  
12.73***  
(0.00)  
U.K.  9.19  2.03  
11.81***  
(0.00)  
Sweden  7.90  1.28  
11.86***  
(0.00)  
South Korea  8.39  2.54  
7.26***  
(0.00)  
Norway  5.70  1.95  
6.99***  
(0.00)  
Developing Country IT targeters without Hyperinflation  
Country  Pre - IT policy  Post - IT policy  
t-test statistics†  
(p-value)  
Chile  31.52  3.11  
9.67***  
(0.00)  
South Africa  11.32  5.29  
9.25***  
(0.00)  




Thailand  5.68  2.12  
5.25***  
(0.00)  
Philippines  10.59  3.81  
6.82***  
(0.00)  
Indonesia  11.01  6.24  
3.60***  
(0.00)  
Developing Country IT targeters with Hyperinflation  
Country  Pre - IT policy  Post - IT policy  
t-test statistics†  
(p-value)  
Poland  56.54  3.25  
8.73***  
(0.00)  
Brazil  167.25  6.41  
14.81***  
(0.00)  




, where Ave 𝜋𝑡  is the average annual inflation rate. 




















    Table 3.3 Average Inflation Rate for Non-IT targeters: Pre- and Post-1990  
 
Developed Country Non-IT targeters  
Country  Pre - 1990  Post - 1990  
t-test statistics †  
(p-value)  
U.S.  6.25  2.41  
10.24***  
(0.00)  
Denmark  7.63  1.83  
10.78 ***  
(0.00)  
Switzerland  3.20  1.04  
5.40***  
(0.00)  
Developing Country Non-IT targeters without Hyperinflation  
Country  Pre-1990  Post -1990  
t-test statistics†  
(p-value)  
Kenya  11.99  11.38  
0.38  
(0.71)  
Malaysia  3.94  2.74  
2.40**  
(0.02)  




Developing Country Non-IT targeters with Hyperinflation  
Country  Pre - 1990  Post - 1990  
t-test statistics†  
( p-value)  
Bolivia  118.49  6.31  
10.55***  
(0.00)  
Ecuador  53.25  17.14  
7.29***  
(0.00)  




, where Ave 𝜋𝑡  is the average annual inflation 
           rate.  



















     Table 3.4 Inflation Volatility for IT targeters: Pre- and Post- IT Policy  
 
Developed Country IT targeters  
Country  Pre - IT policy  Post - IT policy  
F-test Statistics†  
(p-value)  
Canada  4.71  4.31  
1.20  
(0.15)  
U.K.  9.24  4.43  
4.34***  
(0.00)  
Sweden  7.71  5.02  
2.36***  
(0.00)  
South Korea  10.95  4.20  
6.79***  
(0.00)  
Norway  6.20  5.58  
1.23  
(0.11)  
Developing Country IT targeters without Hyperinflation  
Country  Pre - IT policy  Post - IT policy  
F-test Statistics†  
(p-value)  
Chile  43.98  4.81  
83.70***  
(0.00)  




South Africa  8.29  5.44  
2.46***  
(0.00)  
Thailand  8.62  5.94  
2.11***  
(0.00)  
Philippines  13.38  3.90  
11.75***  
(0.00)  
Indonesia  15.19  9.81  
2.40***  
(0.00)  
Developing Country IT targeters with Hyperinflation  
Country  Pre - IT policy  Post - IT policy  
F-test Statistics†  
(p-value)  
Poland  93.97  5.83  
259.98***  
(0.00)  
Brazil  92.83  113.71  
130.00***  
(0.00)  




, where Vol 𝜋𝑡  is the volatility of inflation rate 
              measured by standard deviation of inflation rate.  










    Table 3.5 Inflation Volatility for Non-IT targeters: Pre- and Post- 1990  
 
Developed Country Non-IT targeters  
Country  Pre - 1990  Post - 1990  
F-test Statistics† 
(p-value)  
U.S.  4.38  3.99  
1.20  
(0.15)  
Denmark  8.18  4.13  
3.91***  
(0.00)  
Switzerland  4.72  4.23  
1.25*  
(0.08)  
Developing Country Non-IT targeters without Hyperinflation  
Country  Pre-1990  Post -1990  
F-test Statistics†  
(p-value)  
Kenya  14.49  19.64  
0.54***  
(0.00)  
Malaysia  6.76  4.71  
2.07***  
(0.00)  




Developing Non-IT targeters with Hyperinflation  
Country  Pre-1990  Post -1990  
F-test Statistics†  
(p-value)  
Bolivia  194.75  8.44  
531.98***  
(0.00)  
Ecuador  22.46  23.07  
0.92  
(0.87)  




, where Vol 𝜋𝑡  is the volatility of inflation rate 
            measured by standard deviation of inflation rate.  
    Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1 
 








        Table 3.6 Inflation Persistence for Developed IT targeters: Pre- and Post-IT policy  
 
Developed Countries: IT Targeters  
Pre-IT Policy - AR(k) Model  Post-IT Policy - TAR(k) Model  γAR = βOUT  
Country  obs  k  
γAR  
R2  outer obs  
k  βOUT  sup-Wald†  F-statistic‡  
(std. error)  d  (std. error)  p-value  p-value  
Canada  203  4  
0.66***  
0.24  231  
4  0.12*  2.09*  25.71***  
(0.09)  2  (0.06)  0.08  0.00  
U.K.  215  2  
0.53***  
0.22  247  
3  -0.26**  24.47***  31.95***  
(0.09)  2  (0.11)  0.00  0.00  
Sweden  227  1  
0.13*  
0.02  245  
4  -0.37***  13.84***  15.61***  
(0.07)  1  (0.11)  0.00  0.00  








South Korea  323  4  
0.65***  
0.31  168  
3  -0.09  21.23***  24.09***  
(0.10)  2  (0.11)  0.00  0.00  
Norway  323  4  
0.57***  
0.14  173  
4  -0.33*  8.79***  21.11***  
(0.08)  4  (0.18)  0.00  0.00  
†H0: AR(k) model is a better fit than TAR(k) model. 
‡H0: γ
















   Table 3.7 Inflation Persistence for Developing IT targeters: Pre- and Post-IT policy  
IT Targeters: Developing Countries without Hyperinflation  
Pre-IT Policy - AR(k) Model  Post-IT Policy - TAR(k) Model  γAR = βOUT  
Country  obs  k  
γAR  
R2  outer obs  
k  βOUT  sup-Wald†  F-statistic‡  
(std. error)  d  (std. error)  p-value  p-value  
Chile  299  4  
0.93***  
0.82  183  
1  0.46***  4.43**  20.51***  
(0.07)  1  (0.08)  0.04  0.00  
South Africa  311  3  
0.25***  
0.04  162  
3  0.53***  24.38***  3.92**  
(0.09)  1  (0.11)  0.00  0.04  
Thailand  311  3  
0.38***  
0.10  150  
1  0.35***  10.91***  0.05  
(0.09)  1  (0.10)  0.00  0.82  
Philippines  335  4  
0.67***  
0.34  155  
1  0.42***  12.36***  3.43*  
(0.09)  1  (0.09)  0.00  0.06  
Indonesia  371  3  
0.61***  
0.29  139  
1  0.18***  3.49*  12.85***  
(0.10)  1  (0.06  0.06  0.00  








IT Targeters: Developing Countries with Hyperinflation  
Poland  119  3  
0.79***  
0.47  210  
1  0.34***  3.44*  3.05*  
(0.24)  1  (0.09)  0.06  0.08  
Brazil  132  2  
0.90***  
0.83  178  
1  0.64***  9.73***  5.14**  
(0.09)  1  (0.07)  0.00  0.02  
    †H0: AR(k) model is a better fit than TAR(k) model. 
‡H0: γ





















Table 3.8 Inflation Persistence for Developed Non-IT Targeters: Counterfactual Break at 1990  
Developed Countries: Non-IT Targeters  
Pre-1990 - AR(k) model  Post-1990 - AR(k) Model  γbefore = γafter  
Zivot-Andrews 
Test  
Country  obs  k  
γbefore  




Optimal Break  
(std. error)  (std. error)  p-value  
U.S.  191  2  
0.72***  





(0.06)  (0.08)  0.00  
Switzerland  191  3  
0.41***  





(0.13)  (0.11)  0.06  
Denmark  191  1  
0.13*  





(0.08)  (0.13)  0.000  
      †H0: γ













       Table 3.9 Inflation Persistence for Developing Non-IT Targeters: Counterfactual Break at 1990  
Developing Countries: Non-IT Targeters without Hyperinflation  
Pre-1990 - AR(k) model  Post-1990 - AR(k) Model  γbefore = γafter  Zivot-Andrews Test  
Country  obs  k  
γbefore  




Optimal Break  
(std. error)  (std. error)  p-value  
Kenya  191  1  
-0.05  





(0.07)  (0.12)  0.00  
Malaysia  191  1  
0.22**  





(0.11)  (0.07)  0.75  
Developing Countries: Non-IT Targeters with Hyperinflation  
Bolivia  119  4  
0.84***  





(0.19)  (0.15)  0.13  
Ecuador  119  1  
0.58*  





(0.28)  (0.06)  0.40  
  †H0: γ
before = γafter, Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1 
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Figure 3.1  Inflation rates for Developed IT targeters : Pre-and Post-IT policy 
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Figure 3.2  Inflation rates for Developing IT targeters without Hyperinflation :Pre- and 
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Figure 3.3  Inflation rates for Developing IT targeters with Hyperinflation: Pre-and Post- 
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Figure 3.5 Inflation rates for Developing Non-IT targeters without Hyperinflation:  









Figure 3.6 Inflation rates for Developing Non-IT targeters with Hyperinflation:  
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APPENDIX A  
 GLS ESTIMATION PROCESS FOR DF-GLS  
UNIT ROOT TEST FOR CHAPTER 1 
 
𝑟1̃ = 𝑟1 
 
𝑟1̃ = 𝑟1 − 𝑎
∗𝑟𝑡−1,                   𝑡 = 2, … . , 𝑇 
 
𝑥1 = 1 
 
𝑥𝑡 = 1 − 𝑎





?̃?𝑡 = 𝛿1𝑥𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
 
The OLS estimator ?̂?1 is used to remove the mean from r t ; and we have a new generated 
variable as the following: 
𝑞∗ = 𝑟𝑡 − 𝛿1
                                                 
54  𝑎∗ = 1 + 𝑐̅/𝑇. 𝑐̅ should be -13.5 when there is a linear trend, but 𝑐̅ should be -7 when 
there is no linear trend. Elliott et al. (1996) argue that the values of 𝑐̅ are chosen so that the 
test achieves the power envelope against stationary stationary alternatives at 50 percent 
power. Since it is assumed that the real exchange rates under PPP do not have a linear time 
trend, we use 𝑐̅ =-7. 




We perform an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the new generated variable by fitting the 
OLS regression: 
∆𝑞𝑡
∗ = 𝛼∗ + 𝛽∗𝑞𝑡−1
















APPENDIX B  
 DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE PERIODS FOR CHAPTER 1 
      Table B.1 Data sources and Sample periods  
 
Data Source  Sample Periods  
Aggregate CPI  
IFS statistics (http://data.imf.org) for other countries than Chile  January, 1998 - November, 2017  
OECD statistics (http://stats.oecd.org) for Chile  January, 1998 - November, 2017  
Aggregate PPI  IFS statistics (http://data.imf.org)  January, 1998 - November, 2017  







Average Nominal Exchange 
Rate  
against US dollar  
IFS statistics (http://data.imf.org) except for Germany  
January, 1998 - November, 
2017  
IFS statistics (http://data.imf.org) for Germany  
January, 1999 - November, 
2017  
Disaggregate CPI classified by COICOP  
Singapore  
Department of Statistics Singapore 
(http://www.singstat.gov.sg)  
January, 1998 - November, 
2017  
Turkey  Turkish Statistical Institute (http://www.turkstat.gov.tr)  
January, 2005 - November, 
2017  
U.S.  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (https://www.bls.gov/)  
January, 1998 - November, 
2017  








Federal Statistical Office Germany (https://www-
genesis.destatis.de)  
January, 1999 - November, 
2017  
Norway  Statistics Norway (http://www.ssb.no)  January, 1998 - November, 
2017  




APPENDIX C   
TRADE VOLUMES WITH FTA PARTNERS  
FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
Tables C.1 - Table C.4 show trade volumes between South Korea and FTA partners before 
and after the FTA. Also reported is the percentage change in trade volumes. Trade volumes 
are (exports + imports) divided by nominal GDP, and calculate their average for each 
period. Data are from www.customs.go.kr. 
Table C.1 Trade Volumes: FTAs by country 
 
Country  Full periods  Before FTA  After FTA  % Change  
Chile  0.44  0.26  0.53  107.73  
Singapore  1.82  1.41  2.12  49.87  
India  1.00  0.77  1.39  80.73  




Peru  0.14  0.10  0.22  128.58  
U.S.  8.83  9.09  8.09  -11.03  
Turkey  0.35  0.31  0.49  57.42  
Australia  1.89  1.90  1.79  -5.65  
Canada  0.74  0.76  0.62  -17.56  
China  12.29  12.14  
14.98 
(just for one year)  
23.39  
New Zealand  0.19  0.19  
0.17  
(just for one year)  
 -10.77  
Vietnam  1.12  1.00  
3.20  
(just for one year)  
218.43  
Colombia  0.10  0.10  N/A  N/A  
 Note: FTAs with China, New Zealand, and Vietnam are in effect in December, 2015  








    Table C.2 Trade Volumes: South Korea and EFTA FTA partners  
 
Country  Full periods  Before FTA  After FTA  % Change  
Iceland  0.007  0.006  0.007  16.67  
Liechtenstein  0.0008  0.0004  0.0010  150.00  
Norway  0.30  0.17  0.41  141.18  
Switzerland  0.34  0.44  0.24  -45.45  























    Table C.3 Trade Volumes: South Korea and ASEAN FTA partners  
 
Country  Full periods  Before FTA  After FTA  % Change  
Brunei  0.11  0.09  0.13  44.44  
Cambodia  0.03  0.02  0.05  150.00  
Indonesia  1.59  1.37  1.79  30.66  
Laos  0.007  0.002  0.01  400.00  
Malaysia  1.33  1.32  1.35  2.27  
Myanmar  0.06  0.04  0.08  100.00  
Philippines  0.81  0.78  0.84  7.69  
Singapore  1.82  1.43  2.18  52.45  
Thailand  0.81  0.66  0.94  42.42  
Vietnam  1.12  0.43  1.74  304.65  
 
 




     Table C.4 Trade Volumes: South Korea and EU FTA partners  
 
Country  Full periods  Before FTA  After FTA  % Change  
Austria  0.14  0.14  0.15  7.14  
Belgium  0.31  0.32  0.28  -12.50  
Bulgaria  0.018  0.018  0.020  11.11  
Cyprus  0.09  0.10  0.06  -83.33  
Croatia  0.012  0.011  0.015  36.36  
Czech Republic  0.11  0.07  0.18  157.14  
Denmark  0.13  0.12  0.15  25.00  
Estonia  0.01  0.01  0.02  100.00  
France  0.69  0.71  0.65  -9.72  
Finland  0.18  0.20  0.12  -40.00  




Germany  2.03  2.04  1.99  -2.51  
Greece  0.20  0.22  0.14  -36.36  
Hungary  0.13  0.13  0.14  7.69  
Italy  0.70  0.71  0.66  -7.04  
Ireland  0.16  0.18  0.10  -44.44  
Lithuania  0.01  0.01  0.02  100.00  
Latvia  0.009  0.008  0.012  50.00  
Luxembourg  0.01  0.01  0.02  100.00  
Malta  0.11  0.10  0.14  40.00  
Netherlands  0.70  0.71  0.67  -5.63  
Poland  0.26  0.24  0.30  25.00  
Portugal  0.06  0.06  0.04  -33.33  





Romania  0.06  0.06  0.09  50.00  
Slovenia  0.06  0.04  0.12  200.00  
Sweden  0.19  0.19  0.18  -5.26  
Slovakia  0.19  0.15  0.31  106.67  
Spain  0.34  0.36  0.30  -16.67  
United Kingdom  1.01  1.06  0.90  -15.09  
